Cop kills women who called 911, another ND? (Minneapolis, MN)

[WillBrink]

So, "startled by a loud noise", like firearms in Somalia, is going to be the defense. He's suffering, like I said previously, from a form of PTSD that he acquired when he lived in Somalia. Poor guy...

What a bunch of hokey horse manure.

And how many LEOs in the US were mil who experienced their fair share of "loud noises" yet do an excellent job? I'd hope the prosecuting attorney points that out of that's actually the defense used is/when it goes to trail

[glocktogo]

TBH, it may take them a while to figure out the victimology at play here. He's a Muslim immigrant, but she was apparently an extremely vocal anti-gun Aussie immigrant.

Wouldn't you think the MSM would be outraged about an anti-gun woman being shot by police officer? Just asking. [/QUOTE]

That's exactly what I'm saying. They WANT to be outraged, but they're not quite sure how to do it without undermining their SJWarrioring for a black Muslim immigrant. Competing interests indeed.

[ScottsBad]

Wouldn't you think the MSM would be outraged about an anti-gun woman being shot by police officer? Just asking.

That's exactly what I'm saying. They WANT to be outraged, but they're not quite sure how to do it without undermining their SJWarrioring for a black Muslim immigrant. Competing interests indeed.

The Left is certifiably insane. Even my Liberal Mother-in-law, told me she no longer wants to be considered a liberal. Now she says she's a moderate. She thinks these people are nuts. The thing is, I still blame her and everyone like her for not putting the brakes on the Dim party. They are fricking out of control too.

[ScottsBad]

And how many LEOs in the US were mil who experienced their fair share of "loud noises" yet do an excellent job? I'd hope the prosecuting attorney points that out of that's actually the defense used is/when it goes to trail

Amen to that.

[Chameleox]

It won't happen. Minneapolis PD policy is that such statements are completely voluntary and can't be compelled.

From Minneapolis PD's website:
"MPD employees are required to give a statement when ordered to do so regarding matters pertaining to the scope of their employment and their fitness for duty. These statements or the fruits thereof, compelled as a condition of employment, cannot be then used in any criminal proceedings against the employee, except in cases of alleged perjury by the employee giving the statement (Garrity vs. New Jersey, 1967, U.S. Supreme Court)."
Continuing:
"All employees shall answer all questions truthfully and fully render material and relevant statements to a competent authority in an MPD investigation when compelled by a representative of the Employer, consistent with the constitutional rights of the individuals."
/end
Source: http://www.minneapolismn.gov/police/...cy_2-100_2-100

No, not compelled in the sense that they'll lock him in a room until he talks, but Garrity in a nutshell compels the employee to give a statement with the protection from admissibility on one hand and the threat of significant discipline (usually termination) on the other.

[26 Inf]

Garrity in a nutshell compels the employee to give a statement with the protection from admissibility on one hand and the threat of significant discipline (usually termination) on the other.

Actually Garrity merely held that the governmental employer can not force self-incrimination by threatening termination, those statements are in admissible. That the employees were terminated was not the issue of the case and therefore was not reversed.

Syllabus: Appellants, police officers in certain New Jersey boroughs, were questioned during the course of a state investigation concerning alleged traffic ticket "fixing." Each officer was first warned that: anything he said might be used against him in a state criminal proceeding; he could refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him; if he refused to answer, he would be subject to removal from office. The officers' answers to the questions were used over their objections in subsequent prosecutions, which resulted in their convictions.

Held: 1. The forfeiture of office statute is too tangentially involved to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S. C. § 1257(2). The only bearing it had was whether, valid or not, the choice between being discharged under it for refusal to answer and self-incrimination rendered the statements products of coercion. The appeal is dismissed, the papers are treated as a petition for certiorari, and certiorari is granted. Pp. 385 U. S. 495-496.

2. The threat of removal from public office under the forfeiture of office statute to induce the petitioners to forgo the privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the resulting statements involuntary, and therefore inadmissible in the state criminal proceedings. Pp. 385 U. S. 496-500.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/fed.../493/case.html

In Uniformed Sanitation 1 we get the following decision:

Syllabus: In 1966, New York City began investigating allegations that employees of the Department of Sanitation were diverting disposal fees to themselves, defrauding the City of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Fifteen employees were summoned before the Commissioner of Sanitation, and each was informed that if they refused to answer on the basis of self-incrimination, they would be terminated in accordance with Section 1123 of the New York City Charter.

Twelve of them asserted their constitutional privilege and refused to testify, and were terminated.

Holding: Reversed. The termination of the employees was in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

Reasoning: "Petitioners were not discharged merely for refusal to account for their conduct as employees of the city. They were dismissed for invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination" (283).

"They were entitled to remain silent because it was clear that New York was seeking, not merely an accounting of their use or abuse of the public trust, but testimony from their own lips which, despite the constitutional prohibition, could be used to prosecute them criminally" (284).

". . . if New York had demanded that petitioners answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without requiring the relinquishment of the benefits of constitutional privilege, and if they had refused to do so, this case would be entirely different" (284).


Commentary: Garrity v. New Jersey and Uniformed Sanitation I can be viewed as a two-part package of rights. Garrity protects compelled statements from being used in a criminal proceeding, while Uniformed Sanitation I protects the employee from termination for refusing to self-incriminate. In other words, Garrity provides protections in regard to legal action (criminal proceedings), and Uniformed Sanitation I provides protections in regard to employer action (discipline). They are two sides of the same protective shield.

http://www.garrityrights.org/uniform...itation-i.html

This decision led to Uniformed Sanitation II:

Syllabus: As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Uniformed Sanitation I," (392 U.S. 280), the Department of Sanitation employees who had been terminated were reinstated to their jobs on August 21, 1968.

The day they returned to work, they were summoned once again to appear before departmental management. They were informed that they had the right not to incriminate themselves, but that they could be subject to disciplinary action for failure to answer questions relating to the performance of their duties. They were also informed that any answers they would give, or any information which was gained as a result of their answers, could not be used against them in a criminal proceeding.

Despite the affirmation of use/derivative use immunity for their answers, they still refused to respond. They were then terminated once again, for refusing to answer the questions.

The parties returned to district court, which issued a summary judgment directing the reinstatement of the sanitation employees

Issue: Was it improper to terminate the employees for refusing to answer questions on the grounds of self-incrimination?

Holding: Reversed. The district court erred in directing the reinstatement of the sanitation employees.

Reasoning: ". . . 'use immunity' suffices for the discharge of public employees who 'refuse to account for their performance of their public trust'" (626).

"Granted that under Garrity the threat of dismissal constitutes compulsion, such a public employee given use immunity is not being required 'to be a witness against himself'" (626).

" . . . 'use immunity' . . . suffices to permit the discharge of a public employee who refuses to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination . . ." (626).

". . . if a public officer is asked about the performance of his official duties and is not required to waive immunity, the privilege is not a bar to his dismissal for refusal to answer" (627).

"The proceeding here involved no attempt to coerce relinquishment of constitutional rights, because public employees do not have an absolute constitutional right to refuse to account for their official actions and still keep their jobs; their right, conferred by the Fifth Amendment itself, as construed in Garrity, is simply that neither what they say under such compulsion nor its fruits can be used against them in a subsequent prosecution" (627).

http://www.garrityrights.org/uniform...tation-ii.html

This fascinating trail of events was revealed to me by a co-worker who picqued my interest in Garrity. All three cases meld together to give governmental employees of all type protection from self-incrimination.

To me the elephant in the room from the employees perspective is that although the admissions aren't to be allowed as evidence, there is no way to be absolutely sure that they can't be used to construct a parallel investigation. From my perspective, if you are in that big a jam, why would you say anything?

[glocktogo]

Actually Garrity merely held that the governmental employer can not force self-incrimination by threatening termination, those statements are in admissible. That the employees were terminated was not the issue of the case and therefore was not reversed.

Syllabus: Appellants, police officers in certain New Jersey boroughs, were questioned during the course of a state investigation concerning alleged traffic ticket "fixing." Each officer was first warned that: anything he said might be used against him in a state criminal proceeding; he could refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him; if he refused to answer, he would be subject to removal from office. The officers' answers to the questions were used over their objections in subsequent prosecutions, which resulted in their convictions.

Held: 1. The forfeiture of office statute is too tangentially involved to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S. C. § 1257(2). The only bearing it had was whether, valid or not, the choice between being discharged under it for refusal to answer and self-incrimination rendered the statements products of coercion. The appeal is dismissed, the papers are treated as a petition for certiorari, and certiorari is granted. Pp. 385 U. S. 495-496.

2. The threat of removal from public office under the forfeiture of office statute to induce the petitioners to forgo the privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the resulting statements involuntary, and therefore inadmissible in the state criminal proceedings. Pp. 385 U. S. 496-500.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/fed.../493/case.html

In Uniformed Sanitation 1 we get the following decision:

Syllabus: In 1966, New York City began investigating allegations that employees of the Department of Sanitation were diverting disposal fees to themselves, defrauding the City of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Fifteen employees were summoned before the Commissioner of Sanitation, and each was informed that if they refused to answer on the basis of self-incrimination, they would be terminated in accordance with Section 1123 of the New York City Charter.

Twelve of them asserted their constitutional privilege and refused to testify, and were terminated.

Holding: Reversed. The termination of the employees was in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

Reasoning: "Petitioners were not discharged merely for refusal to account for their conduct as employees of the city. They were dismissed for invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination" (283).

"They were entitled to remain silent because it was clear that New York was seeking, not merely an accounting of their use or abuse of the public trust, but testimony from their own lips which, despite the constitutional prohibition, could be used to prosecute them criminally" (284).

". . . if New York had demanded that petitioners answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without requiring the relinquishment of the benefits of constitutional privilege, and if they had refused to do so, this case would be entirely different" (284).


Commentary: Garrity v. New Jersey and Uniformed Sanitation I can be viewed as a two-part package of rights. Garrity protects compelled statements from being used in a criminal proceeding, while Uniformed Sanitation I protects the employee from termination for refusing to self-incriminate. In other words, Garrity provides protections in regard to legal action (criminal proceedings), and Uniformed Sanitation I provides protections in regard to employer action (discipline). They are two sides of the same protective shield.

http://www.garrityrights.org/uniform...itation-i.html

This decision led to Uniformed Sanitation II:

Syllabus: As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Uniformed Sanitation I," (392 U.S. 280), the Department of Sanitation employees who had been terminated were reinstated to their jobs on August 21, 1968.

The day they returned to work, they were summoned once again to appear before departmental management. They were informed that they had the right not to incriminate themselves, but that they could be subject to disciplinary action for failure to answer questions relating to the performance of their duties. They were also informed that any answers they would give, or any information which was gained as a result of their answers, could not be used against them in a criminal proceeding.

Despite the affirmation of use/derivative use immunity for their answers, they still refused to respond. They were then terminated once again, for refusing to answer the questions.

The parties returned to district court, which issued a summary judgment directing the reinstatement of the sanitation employees

Issue: Was it improper to terminate the employees for refusing to answer questions on the grounds of self-incrimination?

Holding: Reversed. The district court erred in directing the reinstatement of the sanitation employees.

Reasoning: ". . . 'use immunity' suffices for the discharge of public employees who 'refuse to account for their performance of their public trust'" (626).

"Granted that under Garrity the threat of dismissal constitutes compulsion, such a public employee given use immunity is not being required 'to be a witness against himself'" (626).

" . . . 'use immunity' . . . suffices to permit the discharge of a public employee who refuses to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination . . ." (626).

". . . if a public officer is asked about the performance of his official duties and is not required to waive immunity, the privilege is not a bar to his dismissal for refusal to answer" (627).

"The proceeding here involved no attempt to coerce relinquishment of constitutional rights, because public employees do not have an absolute constitutional right to refuse to account for their official actions and still keep their jobs; their right, conferred by the Fifth Amendment itself, as construed in Garrity, is simply that neither what they say under such compulsion nor its fruits can be used against them in a subsequent prosecution" (627).

http://www.garrityrights.org/uniform...tation-ii.html

This fascinating trail of events was revealed to me by a co-worker who picqued my interest in Garrity. All three cases meld together to give governmental employees of all type protection from self-incrimination.

To me the elephant in the room from the employees perspective is that although the admissions aren't to be allowed as evidence, there is no way to be absolutely sure that they can't be used to construct a parallel investigation. From my perspective, if you are in that big a jam, why would you say anything?

That's exactly what it boils down to. If the agency or office failed to put in place checks and balances to ensure that evidence is discoverable by them to effectively prosecute criminal acts by it's employees, they are under no compulsion to draw them a map to it!

[Hmac]

Throwing Mohamed Noor under the bus.

http://video.foxnews.com/v/551601968...#sp=show-clips

[Hmac]

From Minneapolis PD's website:
"MPD employees are required to give a statement when ordered to do so regarding matters pertaining to the scope of their employment and their fitness for duty. These statements or the fruits thereof, compelled as a condition of employment, cannot be then used in any criminal proceedings against the employee, except in cases of alleged perjury by the employee giving the statement (Garrity vs. New Jersey, 1967, U.S. Supreme Court)."
Continuing:
"All employees shall answer all questions truthfully and fully render material and relevant statements to a competent authority in an MPD investigation when compelled by a representative of the Employer, consistent with the constitutional rights of the individuals."
/end
Source: http://www.minneapolismn.gov/police/...cy_2-100_2-100

No, not compelled in the sense that they'll lock him in a room until he talks, but Garrity in a nutshell compels the employee to give a statement with the protection from admissibility on one hand and the threat of significant discipline (usually termination) on the other.

Won't matter. He's going to be terminated anyway.

[T2C]

From Minneapolis PD's website:
"MPD employees are required to give a statement when ordered to do so regarding matters pertaining to the scope of their employment and their fitness for duty. These statements or the fruits thereof, compelled as a condition of employment, cannot be then used in any criminal proceedings against the employee, except in cases of alleged perjury by the employee giving the statement (Garrity vs. New Jersey, 1967, U.S. Supreme Court)."
Continuing:
"All employees shall answer all questions truthfully and fully render material and relevant statements to a competent authority in an MPD investigation when compelled by a representative of the Employer, consistent with the constitutional rights of the individuals."
/end
Source: http://www.minneapolismn.gov/police/...cy_2-100_2-100

No, not compelled in the sense that they'll lock him in a room until he talks, but Garrity in a nutshell compels the employee to give a statement with the protection from admissibility on one hand and the threat of significant discipline (usually termination) on the other.

I made reference to Garrity vs New Jersey in an earlier post for those who are not familiar with the case. I've investigated a number of officer involved shooting incidents. In some cases an officer of higher rank gave the officer involved in the shooting incident a direct order to answer questions. If an officer refuses to answer questions, some agencies will initiate a disciplinary proceeding with the possibility of punishment up to and including termination of employment.