Germany's GSG9 Counterterrorism Unit

[MountainRaven]

Not a very useful tactic against a highly mechanized army with hundreds of helicopter gunships. The air would've been contested for at least the first week. The fact is, the Soviets could've rolled through most of Western Europe if the war stayed conventional, the very fact of which made a purely conventional war highly unlikely.

Helicopters - on both sides - proved to be extremely vulnerable to ground fire from everything from MANPADS to SPAAGs, suffered extremely heavy losses early in the conflict and were largely withdrawn from the frontlines, leaving daylight CAS largely to Su-25s and A-10s. As I recall, the Su-25s didn't fair well against NATO anti-air defenses, while the A-10's ruggedness and 30mm gun allowed it to be more effective against the Soviets (the Soviets nicknamed the A-10 the "Devil's Cross"). Nighttime missions were carried out by YF-17s (which would actually have been F-117s).

They may only be games, but from my time playing Op: Flashpoint and ARMA 2, a modern mechanized force (whether "modern" means 1985 or 2010) supported by helicopter gunships will get thrashed going head-to-head with dug-in infantry with ample MANPADS and ATGMs and modest armor (even out-moded and obsolescent armor, like T-34/85s, T-55s, and M60s). Adding fixed wing CAS (A-10s or Su-25s) doesn't even swing things far enough to guarantee a victory for the attackers, as occasionally the defenders' air-defense teams will be stubborn and dedicated enough to fill the air with enough ordnance to bring them down in short order. And this is without the defending forces deploying anti-armor or anti-personnel mines, IEDs, &c.

So AFAIK, the theory is sound.

[sundance435]

Helicopters - on both sides - proved to be extremely vulnerable to ground fire from everything from MANPADS to SPAAGs, suffered extremely heavy losses early in the conflict and were largely withdrawn from the frontlines, leaving daylight CAS largely to Su-25s and A-10s. As I recall, the Su-25s didn't fair well against NATO anti-air defenses, while the A-10's ruggedness and 30mm gun allowed it to be more effective against the Soviets (the Soviets nicknamed the A-10 the "Devil's Cross"). Nighttime missions were carried out by YF-17s (which would actually have been F-117s).

They may only be games, but from my time playing Op: Flashpoint and ARMA 2, a modern mechanized force (whether "modern" means 1985 or 2010) supported by helicopter gunships will get thrashed going head-to-head with dug-in infantry with ample MANPADS and ATGMs and modest armor (even out-moded and obsolescent armor, like T-34/85s, T-55s, and M60s). Adding fixed wing CAS (A-10s or Su-25s) doesn't even swing things far enough to guarantee a victory for the attackers, as occasionally the defenders' air-defense teams will be stubborn and dedicated enough to fill the air with enough ordnance to bring them down in short order. And this is without the defending forces deploying anti-armor or anti-personnel mines, IEDs, &c.

So AFAIK, the theory is sound.

Agree with you on everything, but I'm not implying you would throw both against an entrenched enemy - they're for going around or exploiting weak points. Leave the dug-in positions for combined arms infantry/tanks/artillery. Much like in "Red Storm", let the T-80s and BMP-2s and -3s dash ahead, at least while airspace is contested, and let the conscripts and old equipment deal with fortified areas.

Okay, now I need to reread "Red Storm". Does anyone have good suggestions for similar novels?

[Diamondback]

Agree with you on everything, but I'm not implying you would throw both against an entrenched enemy - they're for going around or exploiting weak points. Leave the dug-in positions for combined arms infantry/tanks/artillery. Much like in "Red Storm", let the T-80s and BMP-2s and -3s dash ahead, at least while airspace is contested, and let the conscripts and old equipment deal with fortified areas.

Okay, now I need to reread "Red Storm". Does anyone have good suggestions for similar novels?

Might check Clancy's RSR coauthor Larry Bond (yes, the author of the Harpoon game) out.

[pinzgauer]

I think it's possible that a limited conventional war in the Baltics/Poland without nukes has a better chance of happening today than back then. There's a summary of a RAND war-game online from about 2 years ago that concludes Russia would make it to Tallinn in 5 or 6 days against current assets in theater. We clearly have no appetite to actively clear them out of an area once they've taken hold. Something like that, a Russian or hybrid invasion of the Baltics, where NATO doesn't actively engage, would spell the end of NATO in terms of credibility at least. Putin is obsessed with NATO, and the U.S. as the driving force behind NATO. It's the single biggest hindrance to Russian power.

The Rand thought exercise got much press, but it's conclusion is far from the consensus. And the "Assets in theater" have changed some. (Remember, Obama sent some Armor back)

The tactical aspects of the Rand thing are not disputed, it's the utility of the scenario as a tool to break NATO... Short version: most of the groups that study & analyze this stuff believe strongly that an attack into the baltics would rally NATO and make it stronger. Therefore, Putin would not chose that path.

So you have to look at the full calculus: What would Putin gain: some small, relatively poor countries? (remember, they are ex-Soviet... they know what the warts are)

And what would it lose: NATO would rally, there would be a ground war with the US, Baltic countries, Poland, and most likely the rest of NATO. Sanctions. World opinion, etc.

Much of this is due to the continual US and NATO presence in the area. Essentially, there is no path into the Baltics that would not run across one or more US units on exercise. It's both a tripwire and a deterrent. And both intentional as well as public... goofle "Operation Atlantic Resolve".

Which then shifts the dynamics. NATO forces currently in the Baltics could not stop a Russian invasion, but would slow it down, and then retrench to the urban areas and dig in. US presence would be quickly reenforced by US QRF. Poland would advance. US units in Germany would advance, some slow, some faster. UK would join. Then the rest of NATO. It'd be grim, but ultimately, NATO would win assuming it stayed non-nuclear.

Ukraine invasion was a big strategic win for Russia, regaining the Crimea peninsula. Taking the Baltics would not yield a similar win. They already have what they need in Kalingrad. Yeah, they pick up some more buffer, but also some poor countries without much resources they can't already get.

As to the tactical scenarios... Yep, we can't keep our armor forward due to (stupid) treaties... "Negotiated" that away (spit spit). But dug in infantry in the urban centers would be very hard to displace quickly. So defensively, NATO should be able to hold until re-enforced.

But if you believe the experts, it is very unlikely to happen... based on the pros and cons for Putin/Russia it does not make sense. And this is probably one of the best studied scenarios the west has. OAR is the outcome.

"Check"

Right now the old NATO countries are self-absorbed. But given a boogeyman, they will rally. Especially if they think the current buffer of the Baltics will be lost. That's the last thing Putin wants.

[pinzgauer]

Was looking for the original RAND paper, and ran across this:

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the...uld-look-22885

From last week, and it references the revised RAND assessments. Pretty much has the same position I outlined above.

Net-net: Pretty remote odds, if at all

One insightful comment I heard that helped me understand the situation: "Russia is antsy about NATO presence in the Baltics just like we would be if Russia had troops in Mexico. Being prepared against that does not automatically translate to wanting to occupy Mexico and take on all their problems. Nor would we be allowed to do so in the court of world opinion. Same for Russia."

[sundance435]

The tactical aspects of the Rand thing are not disputed, it's the utility of the scenario as a tool to break NATO... Short version: most of the groups that study & analyze this stuff believe strongly that an attack into the baltics would rally NATO and make it stronger. Therefore, Putin would not chose that path.

So you have to look at the full calculus: What would Putin gain: some small, relatively poor countries? (remember, they are ex-Soviet... they know what the warts are)

I don't disagree with a lot of what you're saying, but I think the experts (most of them) and lay-Americans, fundamentally misunderstand what Putin wants and how he is willing to get it. Most experts and the populace at large are stuck thinking of Russia in Cold War terms. That Russia is gone and I think Putin knows that the days of challenging the U.S. as a military superpower 1:1 are over, but non-military technological advances have made it possible to do so much more damage without bullets and bombs. There is a general in Russia, maybe the head of the General Staff, whose doctrine for achieving this new Russia is through an assortment of symmetric and asymmetric tactics, and he's one of Putin's whisperers. Ukraine is part of that plan; fake news is part of that plan; meddling in elections is part of that plan; some type of hybrid war in the Baltics may be part of that plan. Their energy and mineral independence gives them great latitude to carry out this agenda. I doubt many in Russia accurately predicted how successful their disinformation campaign would be in the '16 election. Now they see us tearing ourselves to shreds over it with little attention paid to the actual actor(s) involved. The results have to be better than they anticipated. Without firing a shot, they've turned the U.S. against itself.

The "new" Russia, as Putin sees it, is a legitimate counterbalance to the U.S. and our perceived hegemony - this is not the Russia of the late 90's and early 00's that any crackpot dictator turned to just to piss of the U.S, but that no one really took seriously. This Russia provides a credible challenge to foreign policy and power balances that have been completely dominated by the U.S. for 25 years and they've left us flat-footed. Key to understanding him is that he blames the U.S. for insults and injuries to Russia, real and perceived, going back to the Wall. One of his main targets and objects of hatred is NATO - he is finding, and will continue to find ways, to destabilize the alliance. If the current state of affairs continues, we'll be the ones way behind the times, not the Soviets.