View Full Version : Armor Officer training: US vs Australia
Being a retired USAF type, I know squat about the armor/cavalry universe. However, I thought the below article from Armor magazine was interesting in it's comparison of two different training philosophies. The author (a Lt Col) seems to prefer the Aussie model. The US course seems to put a lot more emphasis on the physical fitness aspects, while the Aussies are evidently more comfortable with live-fire training.
Does he make valid points?:
http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2016/JAN_MAR/1Buckeye16.pdf
Absolutely. I have a number of Australian students in my courses here who are much better grounded in skills at the squad and section level, but not so much at platoon (for their stage of development as second-year cadets).
The Aussies are concentrating on combat fundamentals while the US wastes time on gadgetry and feels.
One of our exercises was to plan an expedition comprised of an Army paratroop battalion, a Stryker Brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Force, and a Special Ops component, supported by Navy LPDs. The Aussies were staggered since that force would have matched their entire nation's ground contingent.
Some of our scale dwarfs others' perspective -- which reinforces why they must be very, very good at basics and fundamentals.
I was mech-Infantry. I see that is an officer's training school, but from what we trained on at the company and platoon level we covered everything in that article and probably more. They do not mention mech-Infantry but they refer to Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (which the Cav Scouts used; could have sworn they got rid of that MOS) which are very similar (slight variations in crew, equipment, armament, and tactics). Though I am pretty sure our LT's did not go to ABOLC. One thing we did not do was joint maneuvers on field exercises with our sister company very often (battalion gunnery and few FTX's was about it), otherwise it was all company internal.
“We’re the best” mindset. Heavy brigade combat teams (BCTs) performed very well during the CAM battles against the hapless Iraqi army in 1991 and 2003. Our senior leaders relentlessly tell us we are the best Army in the world. These considerations certainly do not prompt us to question the efficacy of our training. However, we might benefit from questioning our assumption of superiority and consider that our measures of comparison have been poor.
Gunnery Table VI (GTVI) qualification equals tactically competent crew. Throughout the Armor community, we operate on the core belief that an AFV crew’s training culminates with qualification on GTVI. We confuse the technical proficiency that comes from GTVI qualification with tactical competence. Driving down a range road, executing predefined engagements in a flat and open area and using perfect vehicle fighting positions constructed from concrete is hardly tactical. We see the same issue in the structure of ABOLC. Once the crew phase is complete with the gunnery live-fire, the lieutenants skip over individual AFV tactics and jump straight into collective training at the platoon level. We are missing a fundamental building block in tactical competence by equating GTVI qualification with a tactically competent crew.
Risk aversion to AFV maneuver live-fire training. Nothing tests a student’s ability to maneuver an AFV, a section or a platoon better than the stress of maneuvering while live-firing. In the U.S. Army, we like to conduct our live-fire training on built-up ranges and our maneuver training with Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment in dry training areas. When we do conduct a platoon or company live-fire, the exercise is so heavily choreographed and controlled that it loses almost any value as tactical training. This separation between live-fire gunnery and maneuver training stems from a debilitating focus on risk aversion. Australians view live-fire training as part of the natural training continuum for maneuver training. They build their live-fire battle runs on the same land they use for dry training. The routine manner in which Australians conduct maneuver live-fire training is impressive; it begs the question, “Why can’t we do the same thing?”
I do highly agree with the above though as a whole.
“We’re the best” mindset. Heavy brigade combat teams (BCTs) performed very well during the CAM battles against the hapless Iraqi army in 1991 and 2003. Our senior leaders relentlessly tell us we are the best Army in the world. These considerations certainly do not prompt us to question the efficacy of our training. However, we might benefit from questioning our assumption of superiority and consider that our measures of comparison have been poor."
Absolutely. It's not like the US was using the Soviet Union as a metric; we were annihilating armies we were supposed to annihilate. The irony being, up to that point, a lot of training was just like we trained to fight the Ruskies.
We have often used the wrong metrics against which to measure our military strength.
Eurodriver
05-03-16, 07:55
One of our exercises was to plan an expedition comprised of an Army paratroop battalion, a Stryker Brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Force, and a Special Ops component, supported by Navy LPDs. The Aussies were staggered since that force would have matched their entire nation's ground contingent.
:cool:
No input on Armor at all, but did exercises with the Aussies during RIMPAC in '08 and 2010. The diggers are good blokes.
:cool:
No input on Armor at all, but did exercises with the Aussies during RIMPAC in '08 and 2010. The diggers are good blokes.
Same. I did a float where we trained with them. Fun dudes.
Averageman
05-03-16, 08:37
I'm pretty sure that the AOLC school may prepare a young Lieutenant the best they can with the allotted time, however I have to wonder if a current total risk aversion mindset hinders practical experience?
There is no substitute for safe training, but at some point you begin to lose practical experience when every risk is eliminated. Perhaps training harder and to a higher standard with the knowledge that "This is Real" brings Leadership at multiple levels to a higher standard?
The whole "Shoot, Move and Communicate" loses its edge when MILES becomes the standard rather than real 120mm training rounds. Commanding a Tank is difficult enough, the learning curve takes years to build competency and sometimes the training to be realistic, has to have some risk involved. Being a Platoon Leader and keeping track of four tanks only increases the necessary skills needed.
Using the "Crawl, Walk, Run" method many of the basic skills can be taught and drilled inside the space of a motorpool. It has been my observation that many of these opportunities are lost and no one begins to take things serious until they train up for an NTC or Gunnery rotation.
Do to the Australians having to deal with less budget than we have, I'm sure that every dollar spent is more well thought out than perhaps "Big Army" does. To be effective in this manner the training opportunities we ignore, they simply take better advantage of.
It's not magic, it is discipline.
The curious student of Australia's military might examine its role during the Vietnam War. 60,000 ANZACS served, 521 died there, and 3000 were wounded. Browsing the literature will show that these highly trained officers and men were masters of small unit tactics. An example is their defeating the enemy in the Battle of Long Tan. 121 ANWACS opposed a Viet Cong regiment of 1500-2000 and won the event with only a few casualties.
Ted Serong's name is forever linked to Australian military history. He was a world authority on small group counter insurgency and had a supreme role in training Australia's fighting men.. He served in Vietnam in an advisory status. Perhaps his influence can be seen in the observation described here by forum members.
Being a graduate of AOB (albeit in the 80's) I'd have to say his article is pretty good. Most AOB graduates in the last decade have spent more time walking on patrol than they have in the tank, and very few even know of the Battle of 73 Easting. The Aussies force is MUCH smaller and not as multi-role as the US Army. We are all guilty of training for the LAST war, NOT the one coming up. The space to properly train a Armor platoon is measured in klicks which can only be found out in the Western US. I never thought moving from Knox to already-crowded, Home-of-Infantry Fort Benning was a good idea....we will again pay for our lack of quality training in the blood of our young, when the time comes again...Oh, and please get rid of all this PC Bullshait too...
Being a graduate of AOB (albeit in the 80's) I'd have to say his article is pretty good. Most AOB graduates in the last decade have spent more time walking on patrol than they have in the tank, and very few even know of the Battle of 73 Easting. The Aussies force is MUCH smaller and not as multi-role as the US Army. We are all guilty of training for the LAST war, NOT the one coming up. The space to properly train a Armor platoon is measured in klicks which can only be found out in the Western US. I never thought moving from Knox to already-crowded, Home-of-Infantry Fort Benning was a good idea....we will again pay for our lack of quality training in the blood of our young, when the time comes again...Oh, and please get rid of all this PC Bullshait too...
Yes!
Being prior mech, I can say one thing that I noticed besides the above, was we spent more time on light infantry/dismount training than on mounted. I believed it should have been 50/50. I was fortunate of having my last PSG a stickler for the details on TTP's/SOP's/battle drills. We did spend a significant amount of time working with the dismounts/crunchies on perfecting them. I even got put in for an AEM for my driving ability after an 18 day FTX because of a couple of things I did along with my crew. It got kicked down to a battalion coin (I did not believe I deserved an AEM anyway). My whole crew got an AEM after gunnery for second highest in the battalion; we would have gotten top gun if a crew from our sister company had not gotten to re-run a lane (rules were you could not under any circumstance, yet they were aloud).
Looking back now I think of the tank battles of WWII and the tank and the IFV/CFV battles of Desert Storm and think we should put a bit more focus on those types of engagements. Especially considering the types of armor we would face on the battlefield from formitable foes like China and Russia, or god forbid a current ally like Britain or Australia. One of the things we were required to do was research were our friendly and enemy armor and do classes on their capabilities/armor/armament compared to ours. Many of the threats we could face were just as capable if not more, and winning the fight would come down who has the better tactics, command and control, and crew ability. Who can out maneuver the other.
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