View Full Version : Why were the NVA such good light infantry?
Been thinking about this on and off for quite some time, being an old infantry guy myself. I especially recall thinking about it as a grunt stationed in the jungles of Panama. Yesterday I was reading about Operation Hastings (July 1966, Marines at the DMZ) and how it typified the U.S. walking into prepared positions in thick jungle and having to rely on air and artillery to save the day. Caveat: there were plenty of instances of individual and small unit heroism and guts that overcame the enemy mano-y-mano throughout the war, but the "usual" engagement went sort of like the above.
The ethnic Vietnamese, North or South, weren't indigenous to the jungle. The only ones who actually did exist primarily in the jungled mountains of Vietnam were the Montagnards, where they had for centuries. Most ethnic Vietnamese lived closer to the coastline and "rice bowl" areas of the country. I have read excerpts from NVA diaries and letters home, as well as seen interviews with NVA veterans. The NVA didn't like the jungle or feel more at home there than their American foes. So why, then, were they such good light infantry?
I propose it was for two parallel reasons, necessity and logistics. Let me explain:
1) Necessity
With the dominance of American air power the NVA didn't have any choice but to hide. They didn't have huge expansive bases like Bien Hoa or An Khe. No, they had numerous smaller base camps but had to remain hidden---in the jungle---lest they be bombed to oblivion. The use of underground facilities and the steep learning curve of workable, useful camouflage were also required. The "prepared" positions they had out in the middle of the jungle is where they freaking lived! Imagine the bunkers surrounding any major U.S. base over there, manned by U.S. troops, but moved out into the middle of the jungle. When our guys had days-long battles with entrenched NVA it was mostly because they were in the enemy's backyard.....where they lived. It would be like the NVA repeatedly and constantly walking into the lines of American base camps. Sure, they attacked our base camps many times, but it was well-planned and certainly wasn't a daily occurrence as part of their movements through a given area.
2) Logistics
Because of #1, #2 followed. The American fighting man (then as now I might add) was a heavily-laden beetle, as I've heard an NVA vet describe our infantry. The NVA didn't carry 70+lbs on their backs; hell, that would have been over half of their body weight! No, because of #1 their logistics had to be more scattered as opposed to centralized. Caches of food and ammunition scattered throughout the jungle removed the need to become beasts of burden. This in turn allowed them to truly be LIGHT infantry. Sure, they had to carry some extra gear down the Ho Chi Minh Trail while in transit, but once in-country and engaged in combat they travelled much lighter than the Americans. An AK, pith helmet, and some web gear. Of course this then translated into being able to move more quickly through jungled areas. Americans didn't have shit buried in the jungle and got it all back at base camp or via aerial resupply.....then they carried it!
The "urban legend" of the NVA as some kind of elusive ghosts was because they had to live and fight like that. Overwhelming American firepower dictated the lives they led and the way they fought. They were not inherently "better" at being light infantry, it's just that they were actually LIGHT infantry.
Thoughts?
ETA: the Japanese in WWII weren't enamored with the jungle. There isn't any jungle in Japan! From stories originating from the South Pacific you'd think they were the genesis of the NVA. They fought similar to the NVA for the same reasons.
Agree completely. When you're light, especially in the heart of swampass country, you just move better. You travel farther, faster and can change your position, fall back, advance and move to flank with better execution d/t mobility. The old adage ounces become pounds and pounds become pain applies anywhere on the planet, but in more abundance in areas where terrain comes into play. All of that, fueled by the necessity to be mobile in order to remain alive are the primary reasons. Perhaps a little hubris at first, but I don't think any American was smug about his advantages for long.
Agree completely. When you're light, especially in the heart of swampass country, you just move better. You travel farther, faster and can change your position, fall back, advance and move to flank with better execution d/t mobility. The old adage ounces become pounds and pounds become pain applies anywhere on the planet, but in more abundance in areas where terrain comes into play. All of that, fueled by the necessity to be mobile in order to remain alive are the primary reasons. Perhaps a little hubris at first, but I don't think any American was smug about his advantages for long.
Now I have gotten the impression that as the war dragged on American infantry became a little more adept at jungle fighting and movement. Of course with the 12-month rotation of individuals and not units the knowledge base was constantly shifting. I recall reading about one 101st infantry company (maybe 1969 or 70?) that was going into the Ashau Valley with radio silence......they were going to prevent any radio squawking or being tracked by NVA electronic tracking teams (which they had by that point in the war). They were going to try and move as silently as possible, with not being detected the main focus. No noisy hacking their way through the jungle, instead picking their way through. Slower but safer. Of course the Ashau wasn't a place you wanted to be found in!
MountainRaven
08-28-16, 15:24
The NVA/VPA and the Viet Cong (also the VPA) followed on the heels of the Viet Minh.
The Viet Minh fought the colonial French, then the Japanese, then the French again.
In the First Millenium AD/CE, Vietnam fought the Chinese Empire for their independence, on-and-off for nearly a thousand years. Then the Mongols (and the Yuan dynasty) invaded three times. Then the Ming dynasty (the guys who built Zheng He's massive fleets of exploration that allegedly may have reached the Americas but definitely reached at least as far West as Kenya). All while the Vietnamese were gradually conquering all of modern Vietnam. Only to suddenly deal with French colonialism in the mid-19th Century. Which they then struggled against for another hundred years (interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation) until the Americans showed up.
So I would say that it wasn't merely necessity, it was also two thousand years (or so) of study and practice at fighting guerrilla war.
Networking. Plain and simple. They knew more people and people in the South were helping the North.
People thought it was going to be Korea 2.0. No.
HardToHandle
08-28-16, 17:49
I recently re-read John Plaster's SOG, which spoke in depth to the Viet Cong and NVA logistics network looked like... And changed over the years. Been in the early years of the US engagement, infiltration and staging of supplies was vital battlefield prep. Even in 1965-66, the US mission focused on interdiction of supply routes.
ABNAK's analysis seems to support that.
And despite that they took incredible losses at Tet.
US and South VN forces: 9,078 killed, 35,212 wounded, 1,530 missing
VC and North VN forces: 45,267 killed, 61,267 wounded, 5,070 missing
The NVA/VPA and the Viet Cong (also the VPA) followed on the heels of the Viet Minh.
The Viet Minh fought the colonial French, then the Japanese, then the French again.
In the First Millenium AD/CE, Vietnam fought the Chinese Empire for their independence, on-and-off for nearly a thousand years. Then the Mongols (and the Yuan dynasty) invaded three times. Then the Ming dynasty (the guys who built Zheng He's massive fleets of exploration that allegedly may have reached the Americas but definitely reached at least as far West as Kenya). All while the Vietnamese were gradually conquering all of modern Vietnam. Only to suddenly deal with French colonialism in the mid-19th Century. Which they then struggled against for another hundred years (interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation) until the Americans showed up.
So I would say that it wasn't merely necessity, it was also two thousand years (or so) of study and practice at fighting guerrilla war.
I was specifically referring to the NVA (PAVN to be "correct") and not so much the VC. I have long maintained that the fight against the NVA was in fact not so much a guerrilla war per se, but instead a conventional small-unit fight. Just like in Afghanistan, a country immersed in warfare for centuries doesn't necessarily make it invincible. If you took a Vietnamese or Afghan as a small child and raised them here they'd know no more about fighting than their American friends, i.e. it isn't "in their genes". How much is passed down from father to son? Other than some advice or stories, combat experience is no doubt learned the hard way. In the case of Vietnam (and Afghanistan too) recent experience with combat (French then Americans and Soviets then Americans respectively) could indeed be passed on down, as the fathers would be a commander's age and his son a grunt's age. I still maintain that necessity is the catalyst, and combat has a steep learning curve!
Why were the colonists good at what was, for their day, light infantry stuff? It's because they HAD to in order to fight the much more powerful British forces. Necessity doesn't mean you're weak, just that you HAVE to adapt to waging war with a stronger adversary.
I will add that once American involvement began to lessen the NVA got bolder and became more "above ground" if you will. The Easter Offensive in 1972 was a conventional campaign, complete with NVA armor. However, the U.S. had not totally disengaged by that point and American airpower reminded the NVA why they had fought the way they had for the previous seven years. The offensive was ground to a halt and the ARVN even took back most of what was lost. The NVA wisely waited until after the Paris Peace Accords and America's complete disengagement before they tried something like that again. Saigon fell to NVA regular troop formations supported by armor, not a conglomeration of guerrillas.
And despite that they took incredible losses at Tet.
US and South VN forces: 9,078 killed, 35,212 wounded, 1,530 missing
VC and North VN forces: 45,267 killed, 61,267 wounded, 5,070 missing
Ironically, while technically on the same side, the VC and the NVA weren't terribly fond of each other. Most of the VC were from the South, and obviously the NVA were from the North. The NVA command generally looked down upon the VC. They knew that if/when the war ended they'd have to deal with the VC (National Liberation Front) in the power structure. The VC were a very useful tool to them.
During the Tet Offensive the planners were primarily from the North. Giap and his cronies placed the VC at the "tip of the spear" for the majority of the nationwide attacks (the exceptions being Hue and Khe Sanh). They knew there'd be hell to pay casualty-wise and indeed it panned out that way. After Tet the bulk of the war was fought by the NVA, as the VC had been largely eliminated as an effective fighting force. Not entirely eliminated of course, but certainly relegated to a much lesser role than it had before.
Hue and Khe Sanh were the exceptions. While some will argue that Khe Sanh was a ruse, many believe that it was indeed intended to be taken and therefore give the commies a victory like they had at Dien Bien Phu 14 years before. Hue was the ancient cultural capitol of Vietnam, and the NVA being the ones to take it was symbolic.
Ironically, while technically on the same side, the VC and the NVA weren't terribly fond of each other. Most of the VC were from the South, and obviously the NVA were from the North. The NVA command generally looked down upon the VC. They knew that if/when the war ended they'd have to deal with the VC (National Liberation Front) in the power structure. The VC were a very useful tool to them.
During the Tet Offensive the planners were primarily from the North. Giap and his cronies placed the VC at the "tip of the spear" for the majority of the nationwide attacks (the exception being Hue and Khe Sanh). They knew there'd be hell to pay casualty-wise and indeed it panned out that way. After Tet the bulk of the war was fought by the NVA, as the VC had been largely eliminated as an effective fighting force. Not entirely eliminated of course, but certainly relegated to a much lesser role than it had before.
Hue and Khe Sanh were the exceptions. While some will argue that Khe Sanh was a ruse, many believe that it was indeed intended to be taken and therefore give the commies a victory like they had at Dien Bien Phu 14 years before. Hue was the ancient cultural capitol of Vietnam, and the NVA being the ones to take it was symbolic.
SOP for communists. No different than the Russians encouraging an "uprising" as they approached Warsaw and then stalled until the German's wiped out the Polish resistance forces. The most powerful communists see everyone else, including other communists, as expendable.
SOP for communists. No different than the Russians encouraging an "uprising" as they approached Warsaw and then stalled until the German's wiped out the Polish resistance forces. The most powerful communists see everyone else, including other communists, as expendable.
Exactly.
The NVA/VPA and the Viet Cong (also the VPA) followed on the heels of the Viet Minh.
The Viet Minh fought the colonial French, then the Japanese, then the French again.
In the First Millenium AD/CE, Vietnam fought the Chinese Empire for their independence, on-and-off for nearly a thousand years. Then the Mongols (and the Yuan dynasty) invaded three times. Then the Ming dynasty (the guys who built Zheng He's massive fleets of exploration that allegedly may have reached the Americas but definitely reached at least as far West as Kenya). All while the Vietnamese were gradually conquering all of modern Vietnam. Only to suddenly deal with French colonialism in the mid-19th Century. Which they then struggled against for another hundred years (interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation) until the Americans showed up.
So I would say that it wasn't merely necessity, it was also two thousand years (or so) of study and practice at fighting guerrilla war.
This. Practice makes perfect...
Hard people make badass infantry, right outta the hut...think on it a minute
Moose-Knuckle
08-29-16, 04:26
They were good because they were fighting for their homeland in their homeland.
I have a friend who as a boy was evacuated with his family carrying nothing from Saigon. Came to the US, went to school, got advanced degrees from a big name school and is a leader in a major US company.
Has two sons, both fought successfully to get in West Point to serve as Army officers. One commissioned a year after my son did, and is now in a MI unit.
Loyalty and drive that crosses generations.
Does it make them better light fighter? I don't know. But they have a drive that I don't see in other cultures & backgrounds as much. No excuses even if they would have some justification
Sent from my PRC-104 using phonetics
They were good because they were fighting for their homeland in their homeland.
I'm more referring to the factual cause and effect rather than the esoteric things like being inter-generational badasses or fighting for the homeland. The things that made them move efficiently and the why of it.
As an example of how the NVA changed tactics when they were able to (i.e. once American airpower was gone and they didn't have to be so "light" and hide anymore), it was conventional tank, artillery, and air-supported columns of troops that took down Saigon in the end. That's the kind of thing I was talking about.
Averageman
08-29-16, 12:24
Is there a chance that the overwhelming dominance of our airpower caused them to adjust their tactics and training to be successful at fighting light?
If you are dedicated to winning, you're going to find out what works best for you and allows you to exploit your enemies strengths and weaknesses. If the enemy owns the night, the air, the seas and you continue to fight, the only way to survive is to find another better way to continue on.
On that note, was it winning by attrition or was it winning by perseverance? At some point no matter how successful the United States was, were weren't in there and willing to make this a generational war. In no small way the protests back in the States had an effect on our foreign policy and our will to continue.
I think it is perhaps easy to give them credit for many things, but to continue to fight and resist when we weren't willing to continue on was key.
I know one thing, this was our first AFAIK, real experiment with ROE and we didn't learn a damn thing.
Is there a chance that the overwhelming dominance of our airpower caused them to adjust their tactics and training to be successful at fighting light?
If you are dedicated to winning, you're going to find out what works best for you and allows you to exploit your enemies strengths and weaknesses. If the enemy owns the night, the air, the seas and you continue to fight, the only way to survive is to find another better way to continue on.
On that note, was it winning by attrition or was it winning by perseverance? At some point no matter how successful the United States was, were weren't in there and willing to make this a generational war. In no small way the protests back in the States had an effect on our foreign policy and our will to continue.
I think it is perhaps easy to give them credit for many things, but to continue to fight and resist when we weren't willing to continue on was key.
I know one thing, this was our first AFAIK, real experiment with ROE and we didn't learn a damn thing.
Oh absolutely. That was the "necessity" part of my theory. They had no choice but to go "underground" (literally in some circumstances) or be bombed into oblivion.
I assign little value to the history of a people when it comes to warfare. Just because your great-great granddaddy was Genghis Khan doesn't make you a conquering badass. It just so happens that when the conflicts run close together, like the French Indochina War and then our Vietnam War or the Soviet war in Afghanistan and then the one we're waging now, the knowledge base in personally handed down to the next generation. Former Viet Minh were commanders in the NVA and the Mujahideen of the 80's are commanders in some Taliban areas. That close link of generations at war is indeed helpful. Centuries of history are largely irrelevant unless they connect like the examples I just gave.
I also maintain that while we certainly did not win in Vietnam, the enemy couldn't rule until we were gone, i.e. we weren't ejected by force or driven into the sea. Our own war weariness and lack of heart (as you mentioned) played well into the enemy's hands and they knew that. Neither were the Soviets or Americans driven forcefully from Afghanistan......but that weariness and lack of heart is well-known by our enemies and exploited.
They were good because they were fighting for their homeland in their homeland.
1+ to this. I know we all want to get hard data and such; which makes a great deal of sense, however, the motivation of the individual soldier accounts for a LOT. A motivated person is willing to endure immense hardship and push on.
I will also add that the NVA and communists had far better political leadership than we did. Couple that with a decade of insurgent type fighting in their experience bag and they should not have been underestimated. US leadership from DC was and to a scarily similar level is pathetic. Lately, we have a knack for not having the guts to do what is needed in order to protect our people and national interests. Anyone think HoChi Minh gave a rats ass about world opinion??
Averageman
08-29-16, 14:49
1+ to this. I know we all want to get hard data and such; which makes a great deal of sense, however, the motivation of the individual soldier accounts for a LOT. A motivated person is willing to endure immense hardship and push on.
I will also add that the NVA and communists had far better political leadership than we did. Couple that with a decade of insurgent type fighting in their experience bag and they should not have been underestimated. US leadership from DC was and to a scarily similar level is pathetic. Lately, we have a knack for not having the guts to do what is needed in order to protect our people and national interests. Anyone think HoChi Minh gave a rats ass about world opinion??
They, the VC had a lot of advantages as the "Home Team" of insurgents. Go bury your SKS out by the rice patty and wait until you have every possible advantage to strike. Patience also is not a virtue of most Western Cultures, we sent guys over there for a 12 month tour of duty, they had been fighting forever and were willing to keep going on in that fight. Perhaps after decades of war they were content to see the West pour Millions of dollars in to a fight and let it wash over them until they were willing and able to take every advantage.
Saying "We will bomb them in to the Stone Age" means little to a guy who uses manual or at best, animal labor to plant, harvest and move his crops to market. Time was on their side from the beginning and that Mope you wanted to bomb wasn't living to far from the Stone Age to begin with.
Political blunders, bad policy and the rise of the Socialist Progressives in our media hurt us badly. I honestly think a lot of America's will to continue on died at Mai Lai.
Had we given the assistance Uncle Ho wanted decades earlier when they were fighting the Japanese, history would be very different today.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyIATgssVJw
MountainRaven
08-29-16, 17:36
They, the VC had a lot of advantages as the "Home Team" of insurgents. Go bury your SKS out by the rice patty and wait until you have every possible advantage to strike. Patience also is not a virtue of most Western Cultures, we sent guys over there for a 12 month tour of duty, they had been fighting forever and were willing to keep going on in that fight. Perhaps after decades of war they were content to see the West pour Millions of dollars in to a fight and let it wash over them until they were willing and able to take every advantage.
Saying "We will bomb them in to the Stone Age" means little to a guy who uses manual or at best, animal labor to plant, harvest and move his crops to market. Time was on their side from the beginning and that Mope you wanted to bomb wasn't living to far from the Stone Age to begin with.
Political blunders, bad policy and the rise of the Socialist Progressives in our media hurt us badly. I honestly think a lot of America's will to continue on died at Mai Lai.
Had we given the assistance Uncle Ho wanted decades earlier when they were fighting the Japanese, history would be very different today.
What amazes me is that our government was willing to pressure Churchill on India during the war but not, apparently, France. And then we backed France against Ho Chi Minh. And we ignored him a generation earlier at Versailles.
They, the VC had a lot of advantages as the "Home Team" of insurgents.
True, but the NVA was my reference point (not being a dick, I value your input). They were, without question, the deciding force in the war with South Vietnam. The VC were the "locals", and probably were rather comfortable and adept in their environment. The NVA, however, were from hundreds of miles away and any advantage they gained in a certain area was because they were militarily transplanted there to live! The VC alone weren't going to win without the NVA's help. Of course then the NVA hierarchy fvcked the VC in the Tet Offensive and rendered them *relatively* ineffective in the big picture (of course still deadly).
The GI fought the organized NVA and their less organized Viet Cong militia. Both could take refuge in Laos and Cambodia and cross back and forth from there to South Vietnam. Both suffered horrendous casualties as did civilians in Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam. Google shows that the bomb tonnage dropped by us was several times more than was dropped by both the Allies and Axis forces in WW2. North Vietnam was willing to endure great losses with the knowledge that America would soon lose heart.
The US made the mistake of getting involved in somebody else's civil war while trying to support a corrupt government. The North early on had infiltrated the South's intelligence services, and Russia was reading 100 % of our classified code transmissions.(Our traitor continues to serve life in a supermax.) At the same time, Defense Dept. civilians were micromanaging the military. That's another story in itself. Russia, China, and the Russian satellite countries supplied North Vietnam with military supplies. Many of our Nato Allies(England, West Germany are two)traded with North Vietnam and sent ship after ship to its shore to provide essential material.
You would think that an advanced light infantry would not make so many human wave attacks, but, influenced by Chinese tactics, they did. Chaining some of their soldiers to a permanent position before retreating and using suicide bombers were two other tricks not associated with an advanced light infantry.
Our allies who sent troops to South Vietnam were Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Turkey.
MountainRaven
08-29-16, 23:19
The GI fought the organized NVA and their less organized Viet Cong militia. Both could take refuge in Laos and Cambodia and cross back and forth from there to South Vietnam. Both suffered horrendous casualties as did civilians in Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam. Google shows that the bomb tonnage dropped by us was several times more than was dropped by both the Allies and Axis forces in WW2. North Vietnam was willing to endure great losses with the knowledge that America would soon lose heart.
The US made the mistake of getting involved in somebody else's civil war while trying to support corrupt governments. The North early on had infiltrated the South's intelligence services, and Russia was reading 100 % of our classified code transmissions.(Our traitor continues to serve life in a supermax.) At the same time, Defense Dept. civilians were micromanaging the military. That's another story in itself. Russia, China, and the Russian satellite countries supplied North Vietnam with military supplies. Many of our Nato Allies(England, West Germany are two)traded with North Vietnam and sent ship after ship to its shore to provide essential material.
You would think that an advanced light infantry would not make so many human wave attacks, but, influenced by Chinese tactics, they did. Chaining some of their soldiers to a permanent position before retreating and using suicide bombers were two other tricks not associated with an advanced light infantry.
Our allies who sent troops to South Vietnam were Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Turkey.
Fixed the bold.
It didn't help that there were frequent coups in South Vietnam and no matter who launched the coup, we always backed them. On top of the corruption, it made it very difficult for both the US and the Republic of Vietnam to claim any sort of legitimacy in fighting the VC or the NVA.
The US made the mistake of getting involved in somebody else's civil war while trying to support a corrupt government.
Actually we made the mistake of siding with France when they tried to regain their colony that was lost to Japan during WWII. Ho Chi Mihn originally came to the US for assistance in gaining independence for his country but due to our NATO alliance with France we had to tell him "Sorry, we are backing the other team."
HCM then turned to Russia and China for assistance making the struggle between Communist backed Vietnam and NATO backed France part of the overall Cold War. France got their ass handed to them so they took their ball and went home leaving us holding the bag and not wanting to appear weak to Russia. A year later Eisenhower sent the first "advisers" to Vietnam in 1955. However we were there on a limited scale beginning in 1950 supporting the French as Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).
http://olive-drab.com/od_history_vietnam_advisors.php
brickboy240
08-30-16, 12:01
We were not "allowed' to win in Nam. That is why the NVA was so effective.
My best friends uncle spent 3 or 4 years there in the mid to late 60s. He signed up instead of being drafted. Was Marine Infantry.
He doesnt talk much about it except for a few funny stories. He does have one story of his unit working with a sniper team and the sniper taking out a NVA patrol boat all by himself.
What I do remember him saying was that in open combat they faired pretty well against the NVA. But the NVA used ambush techniques and superior numbers often which made them more effective against the better trained and equipped US forces.
Averageman
08-31-16, 06:54
And then the French took a good look around and dropped out of NATO.
Why pay for defense when the United States is going to do it anyway?
http://www.charles-de-gaulle.com/the-stateman/france-and-the-world/de-gaulle-and-nato.html
General de Gaulle's attitude to NATO, progressing from overt mistrust even before 1958 to his decision in 1966 to withdraw French forces from the integrated military organisation, was part of his plan to provide France with an independent defence policy, while his relations with successive American governments evolved.
In 1947 he supported the Marshall Plan's contribution to the reconstruction of a Europe sheltering under the US nuclear umbrella from the threat of the Soviet bloc. He accepted the creation of the Atlantic Pact in April 1949 to counter that threat, but the subsequent creation of NATO with its regime of integrated forces created a situation of subordination that France could no longer accept.
Another big factor was that although the Ho Chi Minh trail was a long supply line and treacherous for those who moved the supplies day and night by pushing bicycles, the U.S. supply line was much longer.
I have no doubt that our own supply lines were infiltrated with black marketeers who sent a bit of that out to the NVA when it was profitable and doable.
There is a lot to admire in their persistence, but we did an awful lot to shoot ourselves in the foot.
Actually we made the mistake of siding with France when they tried to regain their colony that was lost to Japan during WWII. Ho Chi Mihn originally came to the US for assistance in gaining independence for his country but due to our NATO alliance with France we had to tell him "Sorry, we are backing the other team."
HCM then turned to Russia and China for assistance making the struggle between Communist backed Vietnam and NATO backed France part of the overall Cold War. France got their ass handed to them so they took their ball and went home leaving us holding the bag and not wanting to appear weak to Russia. A year later Eisenhower sent the first "advisers" to Vietnam in 1955. However we were there on a limited scale beginning in 1950 supporting the French as Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).
http://olive-drab.com/od_history_vietnam_advisors.php
Yes, and after the OSS trained him. If I were him I would have had a hard-on against the US.
Logistics and networking had such an enormous effect for the NVA. And given their history they were much better at getting inside the US's OODA loop and changing tactics. Most of the stuff that Sun Tzu said? They did that.
Ho Chi Min and Mao Zedong share similar histories in dealing with the US. Our government is worse than Batman when it comes to creating our own enemies
Yes, and after the OSS trained him. If I were him I would have had a hard-on against the US.
Logistics and networking had such an enormous effect for the NVA. And given their history they were much better at getting inside the US's OODA loop and changing tactics. Most of the stuff that Sun Tzu said? They did that.
Pretty much. If only Eisenhower had adopted a non interventionist policy. If we had cultivates a non communist Vietnam in the 1950s, we could have nipped a lot of the SE Asia cold war conflicts in the bud.
And if Patton wasn't assassinated the Soviet Union never would've been a thing.
Ho Chi Min and Mao Zedong share similar histories in dealing with the US. Our government is worse than Batman when it comes to creating our own enemies
Gotta remember that Ho Chi Minh was an avowed socialist (commie) since the 1920's. Perhaps that and the fact that he was then beginning to fight our ages-old ally France is why Truman rebuffed him? Read about dear old Uncle Ho. A benevolent old man he was not. He had opposition folks murdered because they weren't commie enough!
Gotta remember that Ho Chi Minh was an avowed socialist (commie) since the 1920's. Perhaps that and the fact that he was then beginning to fight our ages-old ally France is why Truman rebuffed him? Read about dear old Uncle Ho. A benevolent old man he was not. He had opposition folks murdered because they weren't commie enough!
Ironically, he became a socialist in France, during the 1920s. Going all the way back to the end of WWI he was a member of a Nationalists group who sought help from the US seeking independence from France.
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