View Full Version : Weapon failures failed for US troops death
Of course the story only a general report, no cause or what type of failures were reported.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091011/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_afghanistan_weapons_failures
WASHINGTON – In the chaos of an early morning assault on a remote U.S. outpost in eastern Afghanistan, Staff Sgt. Erich Phillips' M4 carbine quit firing as militant forces surrounded the base. The machine gun he grabbed after tossing the rifle aside didn't work either.
When the battle in the small village of Wanat ended, nine U.S. soldiers lay dead and 27 more were wounded. A detailed study of the attack by a military historian found that weapons failed repeatedly at a "critical moment" during the firefight on July 13, 2008, putting the outnumbered American troops at risk of being overrun by nearly 200 insurgents.
Which raises the question: Eight years into the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, do U.S. armed forces have the best guns money can buy?
Despite the military's insistence that they do, a small but vocal number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq has complained that the standard-issue M4 rifles need too much maintenance and jam at the worst possible times.
A week ago, eight U.S. troops were killed at a base near Kamdesh, a town near Wanat. There's no immediate evidence of weapons failures at Kamdesh, but the circumstances were eerily similar to the Wanat battle: insurgents stormed an isolated stronghold manned by American forces stretched thin by the demands of war.
Army Col. Wayne Shanks, a military spokesman in Afghanistan, said a review of the battle at Kamdesh is under way. "It is too early to make any assumptions regarding what did or didn't work correctly," he said.
Complaints about the weapons the troops carry, especially the M4, aren't new. Army officials say that when properly cleaned and maintained, the M4 is a quality weapon that can pump out more than 3,000 rounds before any failures occur.
The M4 is a shorter, lighter version of the M16, which made its debut during the Vietnam war. Roughly 500,000 M4s are in service, making it the rifle troops on the front lines trust with their lives.
Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., a leading critic of the M4, said Thursday the Army needs to move quickly to acquire a combat rifle suited for the extreme conditions U.S. troops are fighting in.
U.S. special operations forces, with their own acquisition budget and the latitude to buy gear the other military branches can't, already are replacing their M4s with a new rifle.
"The M4 has served us well but it's not as good as it needs to be," Coburn said.
Battlefield surveys show that nearly 90 percent of soldiers are satisfied with their M4s, according to Brig. Gen. Peter Fuller, head of the Army office that buys soldier gear. Still, the rifle is continually being improved to make it even more reliable and lethal.
Fuller said he's received no official reports of flawed weapons performance at Wanat. "Until it showed up in the news, I was surprised to hear about all this," he said.
The study by Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., hasn't been publicly released. Copies of the study have been leaked to news organizations and are circulating on the Internet.
Cubbison's study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat. He describes a well-coordinated attack by a highly skilled enemy that unleashed a withering barrage with AK-47 automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
The soldiers said their weapons were meticulously cared for and routinely inspected by commanders. But still the weapons had breakdowns, especially when the rifles were on full automatic, which allows hundreds of bullets to be fired a minute.
The platoon-sized unit of U.S. soldiers and about two dozen Afghan troops was shooting back with such intensity the barrels on their weapons turned white hot. The high rate of fire appears to have put a number of weapons out of commission, even though the guns are tested and built to operate in extreme conditions.
Cpl. Jonathan Ayers and Spc. Chris McKaig were firing their M4s from a position the soldiers called the "Crow's Nest." The pair would pop up together from cover, fire half a dozen rounds and then drop back down.
On one of these trips up, Ayers was killed instantly by an enemy round. McKaig soon had problems with his M4, which carries a 30-round magazine.
"My weapon was overheating," McKaig said, according to Cubbison's report. "I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn't charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down."
The soldiers also had trouble with their M249 machine guns, a larger weapon than the M4 that can shoot up to 750 rounds per minute.
Cpl. Jason Bogar fired approximately 600 rounds from his M-249 before the weapon overheated and jammed the weapon.
Bogar was killed during the firefight, but no one saw how he died, according to the report.
___
On the Net:
U.S./NATO forces in Afghanistan: http://www.nato.int/isaf/
Army weapons: http://tinyurl.com/yk95j8z
Weapon manufacturer: http://www.colt.com/mil/M4.asp
Seems like someone has an agenda.
RogerinTPA
10-11-09, 08:59
This is a training and fire discipline issue. "Spray and Pray" only serves to deplete ammo supplies. You cannot miss fast enough to change the outcome of the battle.
There's no immediate evidence of weapons failures at Kamdesh, but the circumstances were eerily similar to the Wanat battle: insurgents stormed an isolated stronghold manned by American forces stretched thin by the demands of war.
Anyone here see another, potentially more compelling reason they were almost overrun?
In both cases described, the weapons overheated. Barrels were described as white hot. Though it doesn't say directly, the implication is that the M4's were being fired on full auto.
I'm not sure if the M4 & M249 are more affected by overheating than other weapons, but I would think that barrel overheating is something that would happen to any other weapon given the same rate of fire. Improvements to the alloy of steel used to make the barrel, composite materials (ceramics?) or perhaps a novel method of barrel cooling might help.
Even in WWII, some air-cooled machine guns had to have the barrels changed out as they got hot. Water cooled machine guns could fire longer, but were heavier. Portability meant having to deal with hot barrels. This is nothing new.
Rifleman_04
10-11-09, 10:01
That and the military is not very progressive or informed in the area of weapons maintenance. Most believe that cleaning a weapon to the point of being destructive to the finish for inspections and then applying very minimal lubricant to the weapon to keep the dust off of them is the way to go.
m24shooter
10-11-09, 10:31
Anyone here see another, potentially more compelling reason they were almost overrun?
I'm going to take lack of support for 500 Alex.
Stick a small unit out on its own and you end up asking individual weapons and troops to do a job theys houldn't be doing. When stuff gets used outside of its design purpose or doctrine it can lead to problems.
I dunno. Going to an HBAR seems unlikely.
John_Wayne777
10-11-09, 11:13
The article makes it seem like they were firing a lot of rounds. While the M4 isn't perfect, it's going to be difficult to find a rifle that isn't bothered at all by going cyclic for magazine after magazine when trying to stop an enemy assault.
This is a training and fire discipline issue. "Spay and Pray" only serves to deplete ammo supplies. You cannot miss fast enough to change the outcome of the battle.
One of the guys fired 600 rounds out of his M249. How many hits do you think he got?
The only justification I can think of is trying to maintain sufficient stand-off distance so that you don't have to worry about Danger Close on air and fire support. Once the enemy is inside the perimeter you lose that asset.
Jay Cunningham
10-11-09, 12:00
I am unsure of the usefulness of speculation based upon this article.
This is a training and fire discipline issue. "Spay and Pray" only serves to deplete ammo supplies. You cannot miss fast enough to change the outcome of the battle.
I agree, there is still to many of our soldiers that don't get the proper training, I would like to know more specifics on this report before i start making assumptions.
Another former Marine already brought the point that most of our weapons training revolves to much around a rifle qualification course.
We should provide more realistic training for our troops and make them perform emergency reloads, soft and Hard malfunctions under stress.
I am unsure of the usefulness of speculation based upon this article.
Could not possibly agree more.
Not that Sam made a mistake in posting, but to say that 90% of our troops support the weapon and to also clarify the lack of needed personnel, then add overheated barrels in the mix...
I think it was written from a poor perspective.
Jay Cunningham
10-11-09, 12:32
Not that Sam made a mistake in posting, but to say that 90% of our troops support the weapon and to also clarify the lack of needed personnel, then add overheated barrels in the mix...
I think it was written from a poor perspective.
Sam posting the article for information purposes is just fine. Speculating on the actual fight that occurred and the role that the M4 carbine and other US issued weapons played is pretty pointless without first hand or trusted second-hand info.
Belmont31R
10-11-09, 12:56
I have a hard time believing the barrels got WHITE hot.
Ive participated in ranges where we had to get rid of ammo....tens of thousands of rounds...and put that ammo through SAW's to the tune of a few thousand rounds per gun in an hour of so, and the barrel didn't get anywhere near white hot. This was 3 shooters per gun...as soon as the first person was done the 2nd got behind the gun and shot until we were through the ammo. There is a video on youtube of some people putting over 800 rounds through an M60 in one giant linked belt and it ran through that just fine. I know thats under controlled conditions and on a range....not a dirty battlefield....but it does give an idea of what a gun can do.
Like it or not the Army stresses cleaning routines that do not benefit reliability. A clean dry weapon is what you are taught for inspection purposes. And people keep their guns that way so its easy to clean instead of it being properly lubed. Almost every failure I saw was fixed with lube being applied. In Iraq part of the time I was at an ECP, and we had a fixed position with an SAW. I purposely kept a bottle of lube just because the shift before me would never lube the weapon used for duty that day, and Id have to lube it at the start of my shift. If they actually had to use the gun it probably would have failed on them.
Heavy Metal
10-11-09, 13:48
If I had to bet why the SAW locked-up, I would not be suprised if a popped primer was in there somewhere.
westcoastfrog
10-11-09, 14:18
AW fire does not automatically mean "spray and pray". Just because every round doesn't hit an actual human being doesn't mean it doesn't have a critical role on the battlefield. Having been on the receiving and sending side i can say that AW fire is absolutely an effective/essential tool in a firefight. I would question anybody's tactical experience and knowledge that couldn't see the advantages of having AW support in any fight whether that fight be in the mountains or in the house (yes, AW's are used in the house and work). agree or disagree....just my two cents.
LockenLoad
10-11-09, 14:42
AW fire does not automatically mean "spray and pray". Just because every round doesn't hit an actual human being doesn't mean it doesn't have a critical role on the battlefield. Having been on the receiving and sending side i can say that AW fire is absolutely an effective/essential tool in a firefight. I would question anybody's tactical experience and knowledge that couldn't see the advantages of having AW support in any fight whether that fight be in the mountains or in the house (yes, AW's are used in the house and work). agree or disagree....just my two cents.
suppression fire keeping BG's heads down while other unit members move is one use that comes to mind, not that I have any experience, these Taliban might just keep coming, calm cool accurate fire is still probably the best, I am sure it's hard to stay calm when your getting assaulted on three fronts, with mortars, rocket propelled grenades and automatic weapons though. I would like to think I would be Rambo like if there but most likely shitting myself, would hope I could at least return some fire. Sucks it seems we did not have the high ground either
Thanks Safety and Katar. Like I added at the beginning of my post, they gave no indication of the exact type or cause of failures. I posted it as a general information, it's interesting to read the media's take on technical info and as the title said, blaming the death of the soldiers partly or indirectly on the guns. We shouldn't speculate on what happened, we weren't there.
Jay Cunningham
10-11-09, 15:06
Thanks Safety and Katar. Like I added at the beginning of my post, they gave no indication of the exact type or cause of failures. I posted it as a general information, it's interesting to read the media's take on technical info and as the title said, blaming the death of the soldiers partly or indirectly on the guns. We shouldn't speculate on what happened, we weren't there.
Agree.
Littlelebowski
10-11-09, 15:41
The article makes it seem like they were firing a lot of rounds. While the M4 isn't perfect, it's going to be difficult to find a rifle that isn't bothered at all by going cyclic for magazine after magazine when trying to stop an enemy assault.
Well said. The SAW supposedly failed too, is there someone screaming that it should be replaced as well?
RogerinTPA
10-11-09, 15:49
If I had to bet why the SAW locked-up, I would not be suprised if a popped primer was in there somewhere.
Could be a number of issues, but my 2 cents is, not changing the barrel after heavy periods of sustained fire, and or, not enough lube applied during the battle.
Got to digging around on this. Not that Wikipedia is the ultimate source, but compared to the NYT...So here is the address for that article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wanat and more importantly, the military reports: # "AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations — Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008" (pdf). United States Army. August 13, 2008. http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat01.pdf. Retrieved 2008-11-11. (Part 1)
# "AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations — Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008" (pdf). United States Army. August 13, 2008. http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat02.pdf. Retrieved 2008-11-11. (Part 2)
The upshot seems to be that the base was set in a less than ideal location, undermanned and undersupplied, very recently established, and in VERY hostile country. The process of getting permission to build it took 11 months during which time the local bad guys had all the time in the world to plan an attack. They used the terrain very well, had LOTS of bad guys and LOTS of weaponry. The word $**tstorm comes to mind. All their heavy weapons got taken out early on, and without air support the place would have been a grease spot in short order. Reminiscent of "Zulu".
Doesn't sound like anything mechanical could have been expected to work 100% under those conditions, including small arms. Simple survival was remarkable.
Heavy Metal
10-11-09, 16:44
Could be a number of issues, but my 2 cents is, not changing the barrel after heavy periods of sustained fire, and or, not enough lube applied during the battle.
True dat. The spare barrel is issued for a reason as is lube.
Thomas M-4
10-11-09, 16:55
Could be a number of issues, but my 2 cents is, not changing the barrel after heavy periods of sustained fire, and or, not enough lube applied during the battle.
Yeap These are air cooled weapons thats why the SAW has the quick change barrel feature and every other modern GPMG has that feature. Never had the chance to train with the SAW :mad: when I was in service but my best friend trained on the SAW and was a assistant gunner on the 240G he commented on every time the SAW would act up on the training range the fix was to pour generous amounts of CLP in it bingo ran fine until it need more CLP . Funny when you are tought PM for the weapons they stress minimal amount of oil on everything.
Belmont31R
10-11-09, 17:12
Yeap These are air cooled weapons thats why the SAW has the quick change barrel feature and every other modern GPMG has that feature. Never had the chance to train with the SAW :mad: when I was in service but my best friend trained on the SAW and was a assistant gunner on the 240G he commented on every time the SAW would act up on the training range the fix was to pour generous amounts of CLP in it bingo ran fine until it need more CLP . Funny when you are tought PM for the weapons they stress minimal amount of oil on everything.
Our SAW's ran best when nearly dripping with CLP. If they were lightly lubed (if at all) it probably wouldn't make it through the first belt. They are weapons that LOVE generous application of lube IME. Once lubed they ran very well.
Again most of the failures I saw on mil guns was lube related or lack thereof.
You also have to look at the context of the situation. Not only is "clean and dry" ingrained into people [for inspection purposes]....but I also remember all the BS about VERY light lube to keep dirt and dust from sticking to the weapon. Some tests were done, and even in dusty conditions running the gun wet is best. But people were still doing the whole "dry lube" and light lube thing because that information didn't get distributed well enough. This can wreak havoc on a unit if you have a leader telling all their soldiers to do that as well. You have a squad or platoon's worth of guns improperly lubed and can result in these types of situations with multiple weapon failures during an engagement.
RogerinTPA
10-11-09, 18:00
Our SAW's ran best when nearly dripping with CLP. If they were lightly lubed (if at all) it probably wouldn't make it through the first belt. They are weapons that LOVE generous application of lube IME. Once lubed they ran very well.
Again most of the failures I saw on mil guns was lube related or lack thereof.
You also have to look at the context of the situation. Not only is "clean and dry" ingrained into people [for inspection purposes]....but I also remember all the BS about VERY light lube to keep dirt and dust from sticking to the weapon. Some tests were done, and even in dusty conditions running the gun wet is best. But people were still doing the whole "dry lube" and light lube thing because that information didn't get distributed well enough. This can wreak havoc on a unit if you have a leader telling all their soldiers to do that as well. You have a squad or platoon's worth of guns improperly lubed and can result in these types of situations with multiple weapon failures during an engagement.
Agreed. It's a leadership failure. NCOs should know the difference between "Garrison lube" for inspection and storage, and running it dripping wet in combat, to keep it running.
Got to digging around on this. Not that Wikipedia is the ultimate source, but compared to the NYT...So here is the address for that article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wanat and more importantly, the military reports: # "AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations — Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008" (pdf). United States Army. August 13, 2008. http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat01.pdf. Retrieved 2008-11-11. (Part 1)
# "AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations — Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008" (pdf). United States Army. August 13, 2008. http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat02.pdf. Retrieved 2008-11-11. (Part 2)
The upshot seems to be that the base was set in a less than ideal location, undermanned and undersupplied, very recently established, and in VERY hostile country. The process of getting permission to build it took 11 months during which time the local bad guys had all the time in the world to plan an attack. They used the terrain very well, had LOTS of bad guys and LOTS of weaponry. The word $**tstorm comes to mind. All their heavy weapons got taken out early on, and without air support the place would have been a grease spot in short order. Reminiscent of "Zulu".
Doesn't sound like anything mechanical could have been expected to work 100% under those conditions, including small arms. Simple survival was remarkable.
This rough draft was posted on another website, and goes into much detail of the lead-up to the battle, as well as the fight itself. It's a rather long read, but very detailed.
http://www.battlefieldtourist.com/content/battle-of-wanat-historical-analysis-rough-draft-release/
Comments on the M4 aside, I've been reading that a loss of intel directly after the gunship attack on a local medical facility contributed to a window of opportunity and motivation for the Taliban.
Conversely, it took 300 Taliban to attempt and fail. As discussed, "weapons failures" may be more overemphasized because, at Cubbison put it, "kinetic" interaction with the population is often prioritized.
The boring dirty work of actually improving and relating to local villagers - the same kind of work missionaries do world wide - is strongly intimated as not being done. Ooops.
Having that exact same difficulty presented to my MP unit the last time I was in the box at Polk stems from (what I speculate as) the same cause - command micromanagement that overrode our SME's. They were fully prepared to engage the population and open channels of communication. As I understand it, the lessons learned and the AAR in that scenario promotes "imbedding" troops - not building segregated targets of opportunity.
If COIN was being improperly executed, don't look to blame being fixed, look to each of us learning better.
gruntinhusaybah
10-11-09, 20:24
the whole new rifle is a solution looking for a problem IMO. The m16/m4 are great weapons IMO, I think we(the MIl) should switch to a mid length system to reduce stress on the op systems. Or upgrade to piston guns maybe.
But before we go and spend millions of dollars on new weapons, how about we update our training standards?
How about we get platoon sgts and cmdrs on board with wpns maint. and fighting with a gun, not firing on a rifle range?
how about we ditch the armory inspections with q tips and cotton patches before turn in?
But Im just a lowly grunt, what do I know right:rolleyes:
I think the Marine Corps is attempting to go in the right direction with tables 1, 2 and 3. But is still missguided, and needs to make training overall more dynamic and fluid, stop running ranges and get out service members in a fighting mindset for chistsake!
I could go on and on about this, it drives me absolutely nuckin futs to see dipshits using a steel cleaning rod to clean the crown! just to appease the armorers who are appeasing the xos, the mothafreakin crown with a steel rod!!!!
and to reemphasize the whole lube issue, run your damn gun wet!
ok, rant over.
variablebinary
10-11-09, 20:34
If a solider says he weapon failed, I'm inclined to believe him
The questions being how were the weapons maintained, and what was their overall condition. If they were in a state of disrepair after 5 years of hard frontline service, than someone higher up should get their asshole reamed.
However, I'm a full supporter of evaluating all current weapon systems and finding the highest performing, least maintenance intensive weapon on the planet and giving it to our military.
If the M4 was the end all be all, there would have been no COTS purchase of the HK416, SOCOM SPR-V trials or SCAR solicitation. Clearly some SF operators are seeing a deficiency
I believe the temperature of the area of operations had an effect on the barrel over heating and of course lack of lube. I think we need to finally move onto newer weapon systems and practices. I believe it would help save lives in these sitautions. I can only hope events like this help change the military's practices.
The Dumb Gun Collector
10-11-09, 20:56
Sounds like they got a bunch of crappy ammo.
Thomas M-4
10-11-09, 21:18
If a solider says he weapon failed, I'm inclined to believe him
The questions being how were the weapons maintained, and what was their overall condition. If they were in a state of disrepair after 5 years of hard frontline service, than someone higher up should get their asshole reamed.
However, I'm a full supporter of evaluating all current weapon systems and finding the highest performing, least maintenance intensive weapon on the planet and giving it to our military.
If the M4 was the end all be all, there would have been no COTS purchase of the HK416, SOCOM SPR-V trials or SCAR solicitation. Clearly some SF operators are seeing a deficiency
Ok not that I don't like the latest and greatest because I do. If his M-4 barrel got white hot which I do not believe but lets just say that it did. Do tell what shoulder fired weapon other than a 40 watt plasma rifle is expected to function with the barrel white hot?
dookie1481
10-11-09, 21:33
Our SAW's ran best when nearly dripping with CLP. If they were lightly lubed (if at all) it probably wouldn't make it through the first belt. They are weapons that LOVE generous application of lube IME. Once lubed they ran very well.
Again most of the failures I saw on mil guns was lube related or lack thereof.
You also have to look at the context of the situation. Not only is "clean and dry" ingrained into people [for inspection purposes]....but I also remember all the BS about VERY light lube to keep dirt and dust from sticking to the weapon. Some tests were done, and even in dusty conditions running the gun wet is best. But people were still doing the whole "dry lube" and light lube thing because that information didn't get distributed well enough. This can wreak havoc on a unit if you have a leader telling all their soldiers to do that as well. You have a squad or platoon's worth of guns improperly lubed and can result in these types of situations with multiple weapon failures during an engagement.
Yep, agreed. I carried a SAW for a year and a half and they failed miserably at CAX when they weren't dripping wet.
Jay
Sounds like they got a bunch of crappy ammo.
The Steyr AUG changes a barrel in 30 seconds. And the part you hang on to, in order to do that, does not transfer heat. The Israeli Tabor, bull pup, designed for dusty dry theater? Like IRAQ/Afganiston...Hullo, need a change? We do. Uses M16/M4 magazines as well.
If you get a really dirty gas piston on the AUG, open it up, big difference in gas piston operation, a wee short sharp whack on the gas piston, not buckets of cruddy gas spewing in to the open action? Maybe some old M16 ammo from the far east? Oh yes, the AUG has 42 round magazines as well as 30s, and because it is a bullpup, is close to the body..
Blah Blah Blah,
30min TIC, fired 12 mags...
WTF are you shooting at -- shoot less, aim more
The peanut gallery here that has not been in combat should STFU.
RogerinTPA
10-11-09, 21:39
The Soldiers who's M4s turned "white hot" probably miss identified what was actually going on. A.) They probably never ran it harder than what he did in that battle. B.) It would have melted if it was actually "white hot". The color change would be dramatic, especially if they were relatively new dark gray barrels. My barrels take on a greyish white hue, when I run them hard. I bet his stayed that color, well after the battle. Mine does too until I wipe them down with an oily cleaning rag. The barrel of my painted krylon (with several coats of paint) 6920, did the same thing today, bled right through, white, until I wiped it down. Then the color was restored.
The article makes it seem like they were firing a lot of rounds. While the M4 isn't perfect, it's going to be difficult to find a rifle that isn't bothered at all by going cyclic for magazine after magazine when trying to stop an enemy assault.
The knee jerk reaction to this is AKs and piston guns. I came here for the real scoop after seeing it on other sites.
Blah Blah Blah,
30min TIC, fired 12 mags...
WTF are you shooting at -- shoot less, aim more
The peanut gallery here that has not been in combat should STFU.
Do you think a week of Sniper training should go into the mix Kevin? Clean and lube, morning and night? Train to fight, not pass inspections? Training must be realistic, taught by veterans of the recent in country fighters?
All my Combat has been boots, head butts and what ever could be picked up. Spent 5 years as a Bouncer in Liverpool UK, full time day job, 3 nights a week to add to cash for young family, got stabbed twice.
74 this month, missed Korea and Egypt (Brit Army) lucky! And the troubles.
Blah Blah Blah,
30min TIC, fired 12 mags...
WTF are you shooting at -- shoot less, aim more
The peanut gallery here that has not been in combat should STFU.
Yep!
Sounds like a lot of spasdic shooting. Aimed fire? Fire discipline? Anyone?
Unfortunately, there are a few problems at work. From the sounds of it, this an arty outfit on one of many small firebases throughout Afghanistan. Most are poorly supported and there has been a general breakdown in basic leadership in huge swaths of the Army. I am sure the Red Legs can put steel on target with their cannons, but most artillery units do little with their small arms outside of basic qual.
Small arms maintenance remains a problem in that most of the Army really doesn't understand guns (nor do they really like guns) and the Army maintenance system is fairly dysfunctional in Afghanistan. There are a lot of half broken weapons in the field right now. People who don't know shit like to bag on the M4. You should see the state of some of the M240's, M249's, .50's and Mk19's out there! Everything is beat to shit.
RESET has been a huge help but the guns that stay in theater don't get a RESET.
So to recap - small arms training and basic soldier skills, maintenance, and good leadership. Sound familiar? Anyone? Bueller?
RogerinTPA
10-11-09, 22:24
The overall problem is a lack of continuity in training and combat experience. Experienced NCOs and Officers, rotate out, and new, inexperienced ones, take there place. Lessons Learned, are not documented and stored in a historical file with most units. Which the objective is to learn all that was gained from past mistakes on deployments, on every issue, from training to maintenance. Some of the units I was in, had files going back greater than 15 years. There was everything on how to plan, what resource you will need on a particular mission, how to plan and conduct two gun raids, night aeriel gunnery, etc... Our AAR were known as "shootouts", due to every unit member had a say in what part of that mission went right or wrong and how it went right or wrong. A lot of folks got butt hurt, but everything was recorded, to be placed in historical records to be past down.
variablebinary
10-11-09, 22:40
12 mags is 360 rounds.
In 30 minutes that equates to 12 rounds per minute, or one round every 5 seconds. That sure as hell isn't spray and pray.
What's the acceptable rate of fire when under siege, outnumbered by Taliban, and your fellow solider are dying? I'd really like to know.
Dont always assume our soldiers are inept failures.
rightwingmaniac
10-11-09, 22:45
AW fire does not automatically mean "spray and pray". Just because every round doesn't hit an actual human being doesn't mean it doesn't have a critical role on the battlefield. Having been on the receiving and sending side i can say that AW fire is absolutely an effective/essential tool in a firefight. I would question anybody's tactical experience and knowledge that couldn't see the advantages of having AW support in any fight whether that fight be in the mountains or in the house (yes, AW's are used in the house and work). agree or disagree....just my two cents.
amen to that!!!!
rightwingmaniac
10-11-09, 22:50
12 mags is 360 rounds.
In 30 minutes that equates to 12 rounds per minute, or one round every 5 seconds. That sure as hell isn't spray and pray.
What's the acceptable rate of fire when under siege, outnumbered by Taliban, and your fellow solider are dying? I'd really like to know.
Dont always assume our soldiers are inept failures.
i couldnt agree more
The Dumb Gun Collector
10-11-09, 22:51
Well Kevinb, I haven't been to war, but I have had crappy ammo! So you STFU! LOL.:D
Blah Blah Blah,
30min TIC, fired 12 mags...
WTF are you shooting at -- shoot less, aim more
The peanut gallery here that has not been in combat should STFU.
Kevin you and several others havepointed out some good issues. For some reason I spent about four hours last night looking into some issues that I thought related not only to this contact, but OEF in general. I've been out of country for what five years now, but from all the photo and video eviadance I see a few things have not changed.
1. Weapons Station SOPs. First SOP's should include those gallon jugs at every weapon station on the FOB, MG's in particular. When the weapons start to act up dump lube on them and things usualy smooth out. Ammo storage. I can't count how many times I found belts of ammo that had been exposed for so long the belts were rusty or dirty. Ammo needs to be rotated and cleaned often. Ammo in fixed sites should be stored in ammo cans. We would link our 7.62 in to long belts and stow them like that in the cans in the positions. 203 rounds also were bunkered in the firing positions.
2. Fire Suppression capablities on the FOB's is lacking. I had traced out a few concepts based off of the old TPU tanks, but you could do it with a blivet to. Bottom line the FOB's need some way to fight a fire if they have one from a TIC such as this.
3. Plunging fires vs. grazing fires. Defense in the mountains is VERY differant then defense in the open. In 95% of all situations you will use plunging fires to engage your enemies. Extreme elevation changes that are often required are not well supported by either the M-192, M-3 or M-122A1 tripods. We often only used our M-240s off the bipod, because we could not get the tripods set up well enough to cover the sector. "Mountain" tripods, the rebirth of the old anti-aircraft tripods, mounting M-66 ring mounts on some sort of hard stand or something like the FN Medium Boat Pintle would assist with returning fire on super elevated targets from a FOB. Free gunning a M-2 or MK-19 at max elevation and max range from a M-1152 isn't going to end a fight.
http://www.fnherstal.com/typo3temp/pics/65af2be008.jpg
4. I see video on the new it seems every night showing soldiers and marines in the defense on FOB's engaging targets with the m-249 from the standing position. It's unclear how far away the targets are, but it appairs safe to safe that they are outside 100m. The beaten zone for a 249 fired off hand at a Talib hiding by a rock is preety full of large holes at 100m for the average gunner. From video you can't deduct the reason for the shot being taken in such a manner. Underlying reasons can be as simple as poor positoning of firiing positions. Fighting positions being to shallow and the shelf to narrow to get a good firing position. Target of oppertunity, ect. I keep coming back to construction of the firing positions though. HESCO bastions while solid and simple cause many issues when attempting to depress to engage targets and with construction. Every one we recieved was either to tall or too short to make a good firing position. In all but the oddest terrian grazing fire is impossible from a weapon mounted on a HESCO. While at Baghram we had some high speed conex fighting positions and the shelf was too narrow to mount a tripod.
Of course all of these observations are from the safety of retirement. Of the 4 observations I make, only one cound have been easily dealt with by a PL/PSG or even a BN Commander.
It would be nice to see if SinnFéinM1911, Riverine and some of the SME's down range could comment on these aspects, at least so I don't loose another five hours sleep working on a info paper that will most likely take 3 years to see an outcome.
gruntinhusaybah
10-11-09, 23:17
guys, lets try and keep the speculating to a minimum.
I don't know what the situation was for them , and unless you were there with them, neither do you. You can take what you read online or in some damn paper for gospel, I wont.
as Kevin B said, aim more, shoot less.
Clean and maintain your weapons, they are yours and its your life and your team mates lives on the line. If someone failed to teach you how to clean and lube your weapon for your stiuation, seek out that knowledge.
Belmont31R
10-12-09, 00:07
These statements are misleading. Yes the gun will continue to fire but accuracy will diminish as you are beginning to burnup the barrel. You may argue that this is wrong but I would say that any machinegunner that ever humped extra barrels would disagree with you.
I have seen abused barrels in the 249, 240B, RPK, and PKM that would keyhole at 10m qual. Just because you can, doesnt mean you should.
DOC
Just pointing out a gun is simply not going to stop firing at all if its been laid on for a few hundred rounds AND properly lubed.
Id expect damage with an 800rd linked belt and laying through it with one squeeze....and like I said Ive personally seen/laid through more than 600-800 rounds in QUICK succession on a SAW without an issues but a squirt bottle of CLP was standing by.
Especially in a fixed position being constantly manned...there is no excuse for lack of cleaning, lubing, and/or 2nd barrel standing by.
Cpl. Jason Bogar fired approximately 600 rounds from his M-249 before the weapon overheated and jammed the weapon.
I'd love to see the weapon that can keep going.
People always talk about AKs (and yes I know the 249 is a LMG and not a rifle) and how ultra reliable they are but that isn't really the case. They can keep firing longer than a M4 but unless you are wearing asbestos gloves you can't hold it after dumping a few mags. I've seen them catch on fire after 200 rounds.
Until somebody solves the "heat from the friction of the bullet" issue most small arms will have problems after approx. 100 continuous rounds and most belts will start choking around 500.
This is why you can't buzz saw everything in a sustained fight. If you can't give the weapon a chance to cool, it's gonna choke.
It wouldn't be a terrible idea to design and issue a piston upper for the AR that functioned a bit more like an AK (IE BCG rides way different), nor would it be a terrible idea to start buying magazines like the P-mag or E-mag instead of the standard aluminum ones.
The problem with putting a well engineered piston upper on an AR is that it's going to raise the receivers height by .25-.5 inches.
Belmont31R
10-12-09, 01:18
It wouldn't be a terrible idea to design and issue a piston upper for the AR that functioned a bit more like an AK (IE BCG rides way different), nor would it be a terrible idea to start buying magazines like the P-mag or E-mag instead of the standard aluminum ones.
The problem with putting a well engineered piston upper on an AR is that it's going to raise the receivers height by .25-.5 inches.
Piston AR's come with their own set of problems. The 416 has not been trouble free at all. AK's can and do jam. LWRC is constantly implementing design changes to improve things and fix issues.
And I don't see the need for it. People talk about piston guns being able to go XXXX amount of rounds without cleaning. Soldiers basic load is 210 rounds...many carry more than that but even TWICE that is only 420 rounds. A DI AR can easily go through a double basic load, and no one is going to be carrying several thousand rounds of ammo where it MAY make a difference. Pat Rogers has a TE DI Colt in the 1X,XXX range now without being cleaned...just relubed..
Id rather see an Army wide definitive lube procedure, better/more cleaning supplies, hammer forged barrels and a better round in the 70GR range than paying money for piston guns that have their own issues.
AK's do jam, any mechanical object will fail given enough time, but few people will deny the AK is more reliable, more durable and more forgiving than an AR in sub-optimal conditions.
I'd rather see the military start replacing the uppers with something similar to the daewoo and replacing the aluminum mags.
At the every lease there are a lot of improvements that could be made to existing AR's. One would be a right side charging handle like the AK, VZ58 and M14 have. It would aid immensely in manually manipulating the BCG.
12 mags is 360 rounds.
In 30 minutes that equates to 12 rounds per minute, or one round every 5 seconds. That sure as hell isn't spray and pray.
What's the acceptable rate of fire when under siege, outnumbered by Taliban, and your fellow solider are dying? I'd really like to know.
Dont always assume our soldiers are inept failures.
Dude - I've spent aprox 1/2 of the time since 9-11 in either Iraq or Afghanistan. I've been shot at and shot people in both AO's
Taliban are not dumb, they will try to flank you and supress you so you don't know where they are moving to. Its not like playing wack-a-mole with Madhi Army types in '04 Iraq. Your not goint to get a great amount of enemy exposure.
I will say for 99% of the time that I have seen it, is that "suppressive" fire, isn't. Accurate fire suppresses and causes casualties, inaccurate fire wastes ammo.
DMR - I agree with your points, a lot of the COP's my 11 years old and I could have overrun due to FUBAR layout and lack of prep.
The old M63 AA mount would give a similar setup to the FN mount (albiet w/o gun sheild).
There is nothing wrong with the M4 (well I'd have everyone go M4A1 as the 3rd burst system makes my head bleed with its stupidity, and I'd remove the auto-sears from 3/4 of the guns. Combat Marksmanship is terrible these days - judging distance and placing accurate fire off the KD range is lacking.
What is needed is more realistic training for soldiers.
Lube - for ****s sakes people, its 2009, we have been fighting for 8 years in Afghan, and guns are still not getting properly lubed :confused: That is a HUGE chain of command failure.
Mags -- PMAG's have a ****ing NSN now - use it.
Ammo - M855 may not be the best, its way better than it was in the past, and its way better than 7.62x39 for shooting people with. That said a new 5.56mm ammo like the BH/Barnes 70gr OTM would IMHO be better for both accuracy and terminal effects since we are not fighting an enemy in soft armor and plates.
I carried a M16FOW for over 20 years - I've never been let down by one, and if I all of a sudden needed to lay my ass on the line today, that system would be my first pick.
I carried a M16FOW for over 20 years - I've never been let down by one, and if I all of a sudden needed to lay my ass on the line today, that system would be my first pick.
__________________
Kevin S. Boland
That is that!
As things trickle out.
200 Taliban attack, Over 100 are killed.
Apache's where used
Unit was just scheduled to rotate out.
The original version of this story seems to have been front page on every news outlet the past 24 hours. How does shit like this happen? All for the sake of drama? More bad things to say about the military, perhaps??
It is a mistake to blame the weapons for the failures of people, this for many reasons. Least of all to be fair to the weapon, most of all to fix the real problems.
Excellent post, Kevin.
Kevin:
This topic has hit every gun forums, I've seen you replied to another forum's post. I've read in more than one post from soldiers returning from that area that only special operation forces are issued full auto version of M4s. Other soldiers including the personnel reported in the article were only issued the version with 3 round burst. Is that correct? If so, the article has a big hole in it.
Thanks.
NinjaMedic
10-12-09, 09:09
From the Times article -
"The base and a nearby observation post were held by just 48 American troops and 24 Afghan soldiers. Nine Americans died and 27 were injured, most in the first 20 minutes of the fight. Four Afghan soldiers were also wounded."
So thats what 55% casualties overall with 75% of the US troops injured or killed, and most of the casualties taken in the 20 minutes of a 4 hour firefight? Damn . . .
Kevin:
This topic has hit every gun forums, I've seen you replied to another forum's post. I've read in more than one post from soldiers returning from that area that only special operation forces are issued full auto version of M4s. Other soldiers including the personnel reported in the article were only issued the version with 3 round burst. Is that correct? If so, the article has a big hole in it.
Thanks.
Sam,
Big Army has the M4: SAFE, SEMI, BURST (3rd)
SOCOM M4A1: SAFE, SEMI, AUTO
From what I posted on Lightfighter.
quote:
Originally posted by Dirt: "I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn't charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down."
Let me translate.
"I am a s**tty shot and do not know the difference between aimed fire and wasted ammuntion."
Yes Afghans can attack like ceaselss swarms of cockroaches (maybe we should bring back Flamethrowers for FOB defense, or Quad .50's?)
However I really can't see anyone firing 336-360 rds within 30min for good effect in the OEF AOR.
Quiet honestly a good 75% of non-SOF forces I have seen in OEF and OIF as both mil and a contractor, had weapons that where in a serious need of both PM and suffering a serious lack of weapons skills.
The other point, is damn as smart as we think we are, sometimes in this day and age you can get overun by a vastly numerically superior force.
Taliban are not dumb, they will try to flank you and supress you so you don't know where they are moving to. Its not like playing wack-a-mole with Madhi Army types in '04 Iraq. Your not goint to get a great amount of enemy exposure.
I will say for 99% of the time that I have seen it, is that "suppressive" fire, isn't. Accurate fire suppresses and causes casualties, inaccurate fire wastes ammo.
There is nothing wrong with the M4 (well I'd have everyone go M4A1 as the 3rd burst system makes my head bleed with its stupidity, and I'd remove the auto-sears from 3/4 of the guns. Combat Marksmanship is terrible these days - judging distance and placing accurate fire off the KD range is lacking.
What is needed is more realistic training for soldiers.
Lube - for f**ks sakes people, its 2009, we have been fighting for 8 years in Afghan, and guns are still not getting properly lubed That is a HUGE chain of command failure.
Mags -- PMAG's have a f**king NSN now - use it.
Ammo - M855 may not be the best, its way better than it was in the past, and its way better than 7.62x39 for shooting people with. That said a new 5.56mm ammo like the BH/Barnes 70gr OTM would IMHO be better for both accuracy and terminal effects since we are not fighting an enemy in soft armor and plates.
I carried a M16FOW for over 20 years - I've never been let down by one, and if I all of a sudden needed to lay my ass on the line today, that system would be my first pick.
__________________
Thanks Kevin, that is well said there and here. :)
This is a gun board primarily so it's natural we focus on the weapons' performance issues from the OP. I think this is likely a "hook" that caught the journalists eyes to key in on. Too much we cannot know. But here is an interesting dispatch via Bill Roggio and The Long War Journal.
Maybe some folks failed to do their jobs right (lube? barrel changes?) or maybe they did the best that could be done under the circumstances. But either way, I think all indications are most must have been doing their jobs very very well to have survived at all.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/an_early_account_of_the_battle.php
An early account of the battle at Camp Keating
By Bill RoggioOctober 11, 2009 9:43 PM
At The Best Defense, Tom Ricks published an "earwitness account" of the battle at Camp Keating in Kamdish in Nuristan province. The account comes via General Barry McCaffrey, and is given by an unnamed military officer serving in nearby Laghman province whose position is not identified, and I won't speculate further. The full account is published below, with permission of Mr. Ricks. I'll define the acronyms and other confusing terms in brackets.
Just a few notes:
• The troop commander seemed to be very level-headed during the battle, and adjusted in a professional manner to several serious setbacks, such as losing his command post and ammunition dump. Only at one point did he appear to be rattled, early on when urging the helicopter to get on the scene as soon as possible lest the camp be fully overrun. The Squadron commander let his troop commander manage the battle and got the troop commander whatever resources he could.
• The base was nearly overrun. As mentioned, the US troops temporarily lost control of the command post and ammunition dump, and the troop commander lost contact with some of his troops. The Afghan Army and Afghan security guards' checkpoints were completely overrun and set aflame.
• The US troops fought hard, and lost eight of their brothers. It could have been much worse. The helicopter and air support was the great equalizer against the massed Taliban assault.
• The US troops lost nearly everything they owned during the battle save the clothes on their backs. You can help them out by donating to the American Legion, which has set up a program, called the COP Keating Relief Fund to specifically help these men. Follow this link to help.
Here are the facts, without revealing sensitive information. I feel compelled to write this because I heard some very fine, brave Americans fought for their very lives Saturday, 03 OCT 09. They fought magnificently.
Eight of them made the Ultimate Sacrifice. I don't know their names, only their call signs. Though it may have been smaller in scale, and shorter in duration, their battle was no less heroic than the exploits of their ancestors, in places like LZ Xray or Fire Base Ripcord in Vietnam. I want people to know that there are still some GREAT Americans who serve in the US Army, fighting for Freedom, who will probably never be given the due they deserve. I don't know ALL the facts, only what I overheard on the satellite radio.
COP [Combat Outpost] Keating was (past tense) located on low ground, near a river, surrounded by mountains - a poor place to have to defend to begin with. The village of Kamdesh was nearby, as was a mosque. About two platoons and a cavalry troop headquarters occupied the COP - Combat Outpost. If you Google COP Keating, you will find a Washington Times article describing the austere conditions there, written earlier this year. I was on duty from 0600-1800 (6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) on Saturday, 03 OCT 09, and heard, first-hand, the events I am about to recount transpire. I took notes as the battle unfolded.
Things were relatively quiet when I came on shift at 0600. Not too long afterward, I heard a call sign describing taking small arms fire at his position. (That in itself is not alarming - I hear that frequently because I hear satellite radio transmissions from all sorts of units who operate in Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman (where I am) and in Nuristan Provinces, where this happened.) The situation, then began to deteriorate. The Troop Commander - urgently - requested rotary wing gunships to support him. He was told they were 45 minutes away, and that he should use his 120 mm mortars. He replied that the mortar pit was pinned down, and that the could not employ his 120 mm mortars. I did not know until I saw an aerial photo later that day, after I got off shift, that the COP was located in a "bowl," surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground. The insurgents were shooting down into the mortar pit from above. The 120 mm mortars from OP [Outpost] Fritshe, a few kilometers away were able to help a little, but it was not enough. Not too long after the fight started, the Troop Commander said that he had a KIA [Killed in Action], and several wounded.
Uh-Oh - now this is getting serious. Not too much longer after that, the Troop Commander, in a voice that was not panic'd, but which had a sense of urgency said, "We've got people inside our wire!!!" He said that he had lost communications with some of his elements at different places on the COP. He had had to abandon his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and all the various means of redundant communications there (MIRC Chat, Blue Force Tracker, tactical FM radios, etc.) His only means of communication was the satellite radio he was using. He said he urgently needed air support. The number of KIA began to climb.
He kept asking about the helicopters - his higher headquarters said they were "30 minutes out..." He said that if he did not get help soon, they were going to be overrun. He had consolidated the Soldiers he had, to include dead and wounded, in a tight perimeter on part of his COP. He advised that the Afghan National Army (ANA) side of the COP was completely overrun and was on fire. The insurgents had gotten into his perimeter where the ANA latrine bordered his perimeter, after they had overrun the ANA camp. His Entry Control Point (ECP) where some Afghan Security Guards (ASG) had been had been overrun.
The ANP Police Checkpoint had been overrun and he was taking a heavy volume of fire from that. He was taking a lot of RPG [Rocket Propelled Grenade] fire from the mosque. His Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was under insurgent control. He kept asking about the helicopters.He was told, "Passing Checkpoint 12..." He said, "I'm telling you that if they don't get here f***in' soon, we're all going to f***in' die!!!" Shortly after that, his Squadron Commander came up on the radio and told him that he was going to be OK, that help was on the way. The SCO [Squadron Commander] said that he needed to come up on FM and talk to the helicopters, who should be arriving very soon. The Troop Commander said that the Harris was all he had at the moment, and asked that the Squadron relay. It was, obviously, a very anxious time. I was afraid that at any moment, the Troop commander would just stop transmitting, and that would mean that they were likely all dead and dying. Someone asked the Troop commander what his target priorities were, and he said that "anything outside the wire" was controlled by bad guys. He mentioned that he needed gun runs at a particular wall, and mentioned certain Target Reference Points (TRP's) such as "the putting green" and "the diving board." Finally, the helicopters arrived and began killing insurgents. It became clear, however, that it was such a target-rich environment that much more air support was needed. The helicopters gave the defenders enough breathing room to better position themselves, reload, etc. Under the umbrella of the gunships, the Troop Commander said that he was going to try to re-take some of his camp. The SCO calmly encouraged him to "fire and maneuver." As they regained some lost ground, the Troop Commander said that he was finding some of his unaccounted for Soldiers, and that they were KIA. He gave their battle roster numbers. Things were looking better, but it was still a fierce fight. I could hear a cacophony of machine gun fire when the Troop Commander keyed that microphone to talk. The mortars were still pinned won, with one KIA and wounded in the mortar pit. After only a short time, gunships had to leave to rearm and refuel, heading to FOB Bostic. (FOB Bostic was hit with indirect fire, also, throughout the day.) The weather in the high passes interfered with the helicopters. Close Air Support in the form of jets were on the way, and the Troop Commander was asked to provide Target Numbers, which he did. He was still being pressed on all sides, still taking a heavy volume of small arms fire and RPG's. He had regained some buildings, but had not been able to re-capture all his perimeter. He found at least one MBITR and was able to communicate with aircraft a little better.
Once the jets arrived overhead, they began to drop bombs on the masses, the swarms of insurgents. Usually, the insurgents conduct a raid at dawn, do their damage, and flee. Not this day. I looked at my watch, and it was after 1000 and the insurgents were still attacking, even though it should have become clear to them after the close air arrived that they could no longer hope to completely overrun the camp. The Close Air was on station continuously after that, and as soon as one plane dropped its bombs and strafed, another came down to hit targets - some very close to camp. The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there. A target described as a "switchback" was bombed repeatedly and the insurgents seemed to simply re-occupy it only to be bombed out of it again. (Several pieces of weapons and equipment has since been found there.) The "North Face" was also repeatedly bombed and strafed.
A plan was developed to get reinforcements to COP Keating. Because it was still "too hot" to land helicopters, they were flown to OP Fritshe and had to walk to COP Keating. Asked about his ammunition (Class 5) at about 1300, the Troop commander said that he was "red" on 7.62 link and MK19 ammunition [the MK19 is a belt-fed automatic 40 mm grenade launcher, the 7.62 ammo would be used in M240 machineguns]. Not too long after that, he stated that he was "black" (supply exhausted) on 7.62, but still had a lot of .50 caliber. More KIA were found, and the Troop Commander said that they were missing their sensitive items (weapons, night vision, MBITR radios - things like that.) The KIA number rose to 5. There were constant updates on a particular wounded Soldier who had a broken leg and a crushed pelvis. They said that he had lost a lot of blood, but was on an IV, and was "hanging in there." The Troop Commander said that he had two ANA KIA, and several wounded, still with him. He said that a lot of the ANA - about 12 - had broken and run when the COP began to be overrun. (Some of their bodies were found nearby the next day, along with some ASG who were wounded.) The Troop Commander said that the insurgents had made off with the ANA's B-10 Rocket Launcher. Throughout the day, the air support targeted a B-10 launch site, but it was unclear if it was the same system that the ANA had lost of not.
The SCO got on the net and said that there was a plan to bring in a CH-47 Chinook as soon as it got dark, with attack helicopters overhead, and that they would bring in ammo and Soldiers and evacuate the wounded and dead. The SCO said that he would fly in, also. During the battle, the SCO always seemed calm and gave a lot of encouragement to the Troop Commander on the ground. He asked for updates (Situation Reports - "SITREPS") but he did not nag the Troop Commander for it every 5 minutes. He let the Troop Commander fight the fight, frequently asking him what he needed and asking him how he and his Soldiers were doing, offering encouragement, but not micromanaging.
The fighting continued all day, even though it was not as intense as it had been in the early morning. As the relief column approached from OP Fritshe, it got into a brief fight, quickly killing two insurgents and capturing their ICOM radios and RPG's. Then, they continued on toward COP Keating. The fire that had completely leveled the ANA side of the COP was spreading from building to building, and was setting the COP on fire. The Troop Commander and his Soldiers had to evacuate their TOC again, because it caught on fire.
Many of the barracks buildings caught on fire and burned, taking the Soldiers' possessions with them. Only one or two buildings were left by the time it was over. As night approached, the Troop Commander told someone (S-3? FSO?) [the S-3 is the supply officer, the FSO is the Fire Support Officer, who would coordinate with the attack helos] that if the air cover were lost, and if they were attacked again, they were "done." The Troop Commander was assured that he would have adequate air support. The CSM [Command Sergeant Major] came up on the net and asked the Troop Commander to try to expand his perimeter in order to try to get accountability of everyone. The Troop Commander said that he "just can't do it, I just don't have enough people. I have too many wounded." The CSM said that he understood, but that he was looking at a cold body on the Predator feed near the maintenance building, and thought that that might be the final missing soldier. (It was later determined that that was not him.) The Troop Commander said that there were "a lot" of dead insurgents lying dead inside his perimeter, and he could be seeing one of those.
I went off shift at 1800. At that time, there were 6 US KIA, and one missing, later found and determined to be KIA. I do not know where the 8th KIA came from: either one of the wounded died, or earlier there was a mistake in regard to accountability.
The next day (Sunday, 4 OCT) when I came to work, I learned that they had found the unaccounted-for Soldier(s) and had made it through the night. During the late morning, the SCO came up on the net and briefed someone about the situation. He said that of five (5) HMMWV's, only one was still running. They had counted eight (8) RPG impacts on one HMMWV {Humvee] alone. He said that the HMMWV's were shot all to pieces. The camp Bobcat had a window shot out, but was still running, and they were still using it to move things.
There was a lot of UXO's (unexploded ordnance) that made the area hazardous, such as unexploded US mortar rounds that had been scattered, as well as AT-4's and Javelin's [rocket launchers]. Most of the Soldiers on the COP had lost all their possessions except for what they were wearing. A plan was already being developed to get them new TA-50, uniforms, boots, toiletries, etc. once they were extracted. There were a lot of sensitive items that needed to be lifted out, because they are serial numbered items that needed to be accounted for, but most everything was ruined. They discussed whether to insert engineers with a lot of explosive to blow everything up, or whether to call in air strikes after everyone was evacuated and try to destroy what was left that way. Even at this point, they were still taking the occasional odd, angry shot or rocket fire. As I type this, I am still listening to the folks who are left at COP Keating, figuring out what to destroy, how best to destroy it (demo vs. aerial bombs or rockets) what to fly out, and making a plan on how best to get that done so they can abandon and close the COP.
Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/an_early_account_of_the_battle.php#ixzz0TlCkAILd
[yes, note the error in the author mis-identifying the S-3 as a suppy officer. A typo I'm sure]
More importantly this link didn't survive posting above:
The US troops lost nearly everything they owned during the battle save the clothes on their backs. You can help them out by donating to the American Legion, which has set up a program, called the COP Keating Relief Fund to specifically help these men. Follow this link to help.
http://burnpit.legion.org/2009/10/the-battle-for-cop-keating-and-how-to-donate-to-help-the-troops-of-361-cav/
I posted this on other forums, but here's an article from 1941 about the Garand vs the Springfield (among others) in mud/dirt.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,884292-3,00.html
JHC thanks for the post. Good debreif, even if from a distant station. The AARs will be gone over for some time, I wii need to try and get on SIPR this week.0
MPi-KMS-72
10-12-09, 18:44
Of course the story only a general report, no cause or what type of failures were reported.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091011/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_afghanistan_weapons_failures
WASHINGTON – In the chaos of an early morning assault on a remote U.S. outpost in eastern Afghanistan, Staff Sgt. Erich Phillips' M4 carbine quit firing as militant forces surrounded the base. The machine gun he grabbed after tossing the rifle aside didn't work either.
The study by Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., hasn't been publicly released. Copies of the study have been leaked to news organizations and are circulating on the Internet.
Cubbison's study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat. He describes a well-coordinated attack by a highly skilled enemy that unleashed a withering barrage with AK-47 automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
woah I know Doug- so does Luke McGillie on here...
more of his work:
http://www.csmid.com/files/pay.html
http://www.csmid.com/files/coins.html :D
Last I knew he was working at Fort Drum as a unit historian or something to that effect. I don't have any real opinion on his research, just thought that it was somewhat interesting that he has gone from writing papers on 18th c British soldiers to this...
Blah Blah Blah,
30min TIC, fired 12 mags...
WTF are you shooting at -- shoot less, aim more
The peanut gallery here that has not been in combat should STFU.
LMAO!!!!!
Julius Carbinius
10-12-09, 20:28
I think it's plain to see that this story goes back to Sen. Coburn's attempt to get rid of the M4 as America's battle rifle.
Now he's got a reporter cherry-picking an event from over a year ago and comparing that event to a recent battle in order to "justify" why the Army needs to buy new rifles.
I say hogwash.
The real blame is not the rifle, but as others here have said, the blame rests with those individuals that allowed such an attack to occur.
This is nothing more than a political attempt by one senator to procure an arms deal.
Nothing to see here. Move along...
SW-Shooter
10-12-09, 20:33
This is merely a case of back seat driving, it's a tough war and when the crap starts raining down the only solution sometimes is to put as much lead down range as you can to keep them from getting the time to fire accurately at you and your buddies.
The remedy is more boots on the ground and more assets available, period!
AW fire does not automatically mean "spray and pray". Just because every round doesn't hit an actual human being doesn't mean it doesn't have a critical role on the battlefield. Having been on the receiving and sending side i can say that AW fire is absolutely an effective/essential tool in a firefight. I would question anybody's tactical experience and knowledge that couldn't see the advantages of having AW support in any fight whether that fight be in the mountains or in the house (yes, AW's are used in the house and work). agree or disagree....just my two cents.
I agree with you West Coast. There is a reason that every fire team has an automatic rifleman. Our doctrine is to win with superior firepower. Some cases that firepower comes from volume of fire versus the amount of weapons pointing downrange. I don't want to read to much into the article because it deosn't tell us much. But the M4s we are issued are semi and burst. You don't get true full auto with a burst weapon. I believe that our soldiers were delivering well aimed fire from cover to targets that were also in cover. You can't keep your head up long enough to wait for an aggressor to break cover and manuever when your position is getting hammered. Believe me it sucks when you are under fire from multiple positions and you don't have a target to engage. The best you can hope for is to keep them honest by sending as many rounds downrange as humanly possible. No one wants the fight to devolve into CQC as you are overrun.
BTW, M4A1s (Semi - Full Auto) are issued to SF and other SpeOps types. Soldiers are modifying their issued M4s to the M4A1 configuration by switching our the triggers. The Army addressed the Mod issue in the August edition of Preventive Maintenance Monthly.
Let me throw in a similar story to this. Back in 2006-07 I was on a contract in Iraq (Anbar province) where there was very little outside oversight. On one particular day we were involved in a firefight with the local "hajji's". We were outfitted with Colt M16A2 rifles, Bushmaster M4geries, a few Colt M4's and M249's..
My T/L (former SEAL) blasted approx. 900 rounds through his weapon (Bushy) in 45 minutes and his bolt had a catastrophic failure.
Another person armed with an M249 put about 1200 rds down range. All in all I believe that there were approx. 6000 rounds expended.
Point of this story is that there was no fire control or discipline and when I asked the M249 gunner what he was shooting at he said "suppressive fire on the enemy." I asked what "suppressive fire" we can't even see what the hell is going on. Not only was the whole thing absurd, but had it not been for a few enterprising individuals most of the team ammo supply would have been depleted thereby leaving us open in the event of another engagement. All of the weapons worked as they were designed and in the case of the one Bushy bolt since these weapons were previously used and there were no maintenance records, schedules or anything else who knows how many rounds had been put through them. And of course the full auto fire didn't help.
I once put 3, 200 round drums through a saw in less than ten minutes, no issues. You take care of it and it will take care of you.
photosniper
10-13-09, 07:52
If you have time, check out this video package on the soldiers of Company Viper. There is some great footage of a firefight in the same AO as where this most recent event happened.
While watching the video, they show and talk about weapons failures, particularly the M240. They do show the unit laying down a ton of "suppressive" fire during the course of the video package.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33107901/vp/33231712
(yea, I know. it's MSNBC. It is a good story though)
I read through the Troops Trained for Auto Fire thread to see if I could post this question there, but it didn't seem relevant to that conversation, so I decided to bring this thread back for a bit to see if anyone could answer my question.
How would an AK handle having 12 mags dumped through it in less then half an hour? Hypothetically of course.
Depends. A friend of mine on a PSC contract had his (Iraqi AK issued) "grenade" from the first round fired through it.
John_Wayne777
10-13-09, 19:25
What AK? Firing what ammo? How was it maintained? How was it lubed?
There is a persistent belief out there that the AK is somehow magical and immune to maintenance requirements, impervious to QC issues, and unconcerned with what it is fed simply because it is an "AK". Nothing could be further from the truth. If you talk to the guys who have spent time in the sandbox (especially working with the locals) they will tell you that they've encountered plenty of AK's that don't run.
Any individual specimen may handle it just fine or may choke like a politician trying to tell the truth depending on a number of factors. It's impossible to say.
What can be said with relative certainty is that there's no assault rifle on earth that can do mag dump after mag dump without encountering a problem sooner or later.
MPi-KMS-72
10-13-09, 19:38
The original version of this story seems to have been front page on every news outlet the past 24 hours. How does shit like this happen? All for the sake of drama? More bad things to say about the military, perhaps??
Exactly. Everyone likes drama and people can exploit it to further their agenda.
From what I've now been told the paper Cubbison was working on isn't even finished and the leaked version is being misquoted and taken out of context by the press. Failures with SAWs are being attributed to M4s etc. :rolleyes:
What AK? Firing what ammo? How was it maintained? How was it lubed?
There is a persistent belief out there that the AK is somehow magical and immune to maintenance requirements, impervious to QC issues, and unconcerned with what it is fed simply because it is an "AK". Nothing could be further from the truth. If you talk to the guys who have spent time in the sandbox (especially working with the locals) they will tell you that they've encountered plenty of AK's that don't run.
Any individual specimen may handle it just fine or may choke like a politician trying to tell the truth depending on a number of factors. It's impossible to say.
What can be said with relative certainty is that there's no assault rifle on earth that can do mag dump after mag dump without encountering a problem sooner or later.
I was in no way trying to indicate that I thought it would be impervious to malfunction, in fact I was thinking the opposite, that it too would fail. So for the sake of this discussion, let's say an average AK from a decent manufacturer that was shooting military issue bulk ammo, and hadn't been properly maintained by it's owner.
edited to add:
I was posting the question as a potential counter study to all of the hype that this story has gotten. I was thinking that since everyone thinks the AK is the "super gun", that it would provide a good platform to show that ANY gun if treated wrong will malfunction. For example what about a SIG, or a SCAR? Would it fail after 360 full auto rounds in less then half an hour?
Anyone who claims that the AK is a Wunderwaffe has never worked on them. They can be a PITA to work on as well. And when the ejector goes, then so does the entire receiver unless you have someone who can skillfullly remove and weld another in place.
I had AK's from at least 7 different countries and multiple variations on my last contract so I have seen a few.
The point is that the M4 will run easily 360 rds in 30 min, if it does not it is an operator issue - being that it is either not lubed correctly (and somewhat cleaned) or defective/worn parts should be cleaned.
Cincinnatus
10-15-09, 16:42
Sam posting the article for information purposes is just fine. Speculating on the actual fight that occurred and the role that the M4 carbine and other US issued weapons played is pretty pointless without first hand or trusted second-hand info.
Here is a link to the actual Army report. More info than you can read in one sitting here, especially in the recomendations part. http://www.battlefieldtourist.com/content/battle-of-wanat-historical-analysis-rough-draft-release/
AW fire does not automatically mean "spray and pray". Just because every round doesn't hit an actual human being doesn't mean it doesn't have a critical role on the battlefield. Having been on the receiving and sending side i can say that AW fire is absolutely an effective/essential tool in a firefight. I would question anybody's tactical experience and knowledge that couldn't see the advantages of having AW support in any fight whether that fight be in the mountains or in the house (yes, AW's are used in the house and work). agree or disagree....just my two cents.
I absolutely agree. Keeping the other guy's head down while your fire team makes a rush forward is essential. AW fire is absolutely necessary in an actual force on force encounter.
Got to digging around on this. Not that Wikipedia is the ultimate source, but compared to the NYT...So here is the address for that article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wanat and more importantly, the military reports: # "AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations — Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008" (pdf). United States Army. August 13, 2008. http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat01.pdf. Retrieved 2008-11-11. (Part 1)
# "AR 15-6 Investigation Findings and Recommendations — Vehicle Patrol Base (VPB) Wanat Complex Attack and Casualties, 13 July 2008" (pdf). United States Army. August 13, 2008. http://www.stripes.com/08/nov08/wanat02.pdf. Retrieved 2008-11-11. (Part 2)
The upshot seems to be that the base was set in a less than ideal location, undermanned and undersupplied, very recently established, and in VERY hostile country. The process of getting permission to build it took 11 months during which time the local bad guys had all the time in the world to plan an attack. They used the terrain very well, had LOTS of bad guys and LOTS of weaponry. The word $**tstorm comes to mind. All their heavy weapons got taken out early on, and without air support the place would have been a grease spot in short order. Reminiscent of "Zulu".
Doesn't sound like anything mechanical could have been expected to work 100% under those conditions, including small arms. Simple survival was remarkable.
As a military historian, I have done a lot of work on the Korean War, and this sounds a hell of a lot like the fights our boys were in in the stalemate phase of Korea, isolated in an OP, surrounded by enemy, and then all hell breaks loose. Some questions that the full report almost assuredly address are: why wasn't artillery fire sighted in to enclose the Army's fortifications in a wall of steel? Or if it was, why was this not effective? Why were fu-gas and claymore's not set up to repel an assault? If they were, what went wrong and how did the enemy get past these defenses? What about barbed wire? In other words, the Army has numerous resources that should have been in place to keep an enemy mostly armed with small arms and mortars from being able to make an overwhelming assault. I am sure the report addresses these issues in more detail and explains why such measures were either: not employed, or did not work. So to blame everything on smallarms failures begs a much larger question.
The overall problem is a lack of continuity in training and combat experience. Experienced NCOs and Officers, rotate out, and new, inexperienced ones, take there place. Lessons Learned, are not documented and stored in a historical file with most units. Which the objective is to learn all that was gained from past mistakes on deployments, on every issue, from training to maintenance. Some of the units I was in, had files going back greater than 15 years. There was everything on how to plan, what resource you will need on a particular mission, how to plan and conduct two gun raids, night aeriel gunnery, etc... Our AAR were known as "shootouts", due to every unit member had a say in what part of that mission went right or wrong and how it went right or wrong. A lot of folks got butt hurt, but everything was recorded, to be placed in historical records to be past down.
Outstanding job in your units. I wish all units did that.
Kevin you and several others havepointed out some good issues. For some reason I spent about four hours last night looking into some issues that I thought related not only to this contact, but OEF in general. I've been out of country for what five years now, but from all the photo and video eviadance I see a few things have not changed.
1. Weapons Station SOPs. First SOP's should include those gallon jugs at every weapon station on the FOB, MG's in particular. When the weapons start to act up dump lube on them and things usualy smooth out. Ammo storage. I can't count how many times I found belts of ammo that had been exposed for so long the belts were rusty or dirty. Ammo needs to be rotated and cleaned often. Ammo in fixed sites should be stored in ammo cans. We would link our 7.62 in to long belts and stow them like that in the cans in the positions. 203 rounds also were bunkered in the firing positions.
2. Fire Suppression capablities on the FOB's is lacking. I had traced out a few concepts based off of the old TPU tanks, but you could do it with a blivet to. Bottom line the FOB's need some way to fight a fire if they have one from a TIC such as this.
3. Plunging fires vs. grazing fires. Defense in the mountains is VERY differant then defense in the open. In 95% of all situations you will use plunging fires to engage your enemies. Extreme elevation changes that are often required are not well supported by either the M-192, M-3 or M-122A1 tripods. We often only used our M-240s off the bipod, because we could not get the tripods set up well enough to cover the sector. "Mountain" tripods, the rebirth of the old anti-aircraft tripods, mounting M-66 ring mounts on some sort of hard stand or something like the FN Medium Boat Pintle would assist with returning fire on super elevated targets from a FOB. Free gunning a M-2 or MK-19 at max elevation and max range from a M-1152 isn't going to end a fight.
http://www.fnherstal.com/typo3temp/pics/65af2be008.jpg
4. I see video on the new it seems every night showing soldiers and marines in the defense on FOB's engaging targets with the m-249 from the standing position. It's unclear how far away the targets are, but it appairs safe to safe that they are outside 100m. The beaten zone for a 249 fired off hand at a Talib hiding by a rock is preety full of large holes at 100m for the average gunner. From video you can't deduct the reason for the shot being taken in such a manner. Underlying reasons can be as simple as poor positoning of firiing positions. Fighting positions being to shallow and the shelf to narrow to get a good firing position. Target of oppertunity, ect. I keep coming back to construction of the firing positions though. HESCO bastions while solid and simple cause many issues when attempting to depress to engage targets and with construction. Every one we recieved was either to tall or too short to make a good firing position. In all but the oddest terrian grazing fire is impossible from a weapon mounted on a HESCO. While at Baghram we had some high speed conex fighting positions and the shelf was too narrow to mount a tripod.
Of course all of these observations are from the safety of retirement. Of the 4 observations I make, only one cound have been easily dealt with by a PL/PSG or even a BN Commander.
It would be nice to see if SinnFéinM1911, Riverine and some of the SME's down range could comment on these aspects, at least so I don't loose another five hours sleep working on a info paper that will most likely take 3 years to see an outcome.
Your point about plunging fire is right on. When firing down or up hill you have to compensate, especially firing downhill you have to aim low. I'm not sure how much elevation had a role in the Wanat fight, however. As for suppressing fire, how about some quad fifties? Or even just a few tanks? of course, hindsight is 20 20. There may have been all kinds of tactical and operational reasons why things were not set up what we would consider ideal for defense, not least of which is the thin allocation of resources to OPs, and training, which has already been mentioned.
It wouldn't be a terrible idea to design and issue a piston upper for the AR that functioned a bit more like an AK (IE BCG rides way different), nor would it be a terrible idea to start buying magazines like the P-mag or E-mag instead of the standard aluminum ones.
The problem with putting a well engineered piston upper on an AR is that it's going to raise the receivers height by .25-.5 inches.
You mean like the Magpul Masada? It's not a dedicated upper for an AR, but it does use some existing AR components.
What AK? Firing what ammo? How was it maintained? How was it lubed?
There is a persistent belief out there that the AK is somehow magical and immune to maintenance requirements, impervious to QC issues, and unconcerned with what it is fed simply because it is an "AK". Nothing could be further from the truth. If you talk to the guys who have spent time in the sandbox (especially working with the locals) they will tell you that they've encountered plenty of AK's that don't run.
Any individual specimen may handle it just fine or may choke like a politician trying to tell the truth depending on a number of factors. It's impossible to say.
What can be said with relative certainty is that there's no assault rifle on earth that can do mag dump after mag dump without encountering a problem sooner or later.
The problem over in the ME is not like here where you know an AR made by Bushy sucks and one by BCM rocks, just over the damn border in Pakistan, they make AKs and anything else you can imagine in little huts. I would not be surprised to see many of weapons so made have catastrophic failures. See this video for documentation on this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGVianQJsmQ&feature=PlayList&p=F6793E00D99266EA&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=11
winfield - thanks for posting the historical analysis draft. As a historian, I hope you continue to add light to the heat here.
The best part of the paper was this quote by Clausewitz:
“Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power! Any defect of action and effort will turn to the advantage of the enemy, and it will not be easy to change from a fencer’s position to that of a wrestler. A slight blow may then often be enough to cause a total collapse.”
And it is for this reason that I am deeply skeptical that we will 'win' in Afghanistan.
Cincinnatus
10-15-09, 22:01
winfield - thanks for posting the historical analysis draft. As a historian, I hope you continue to add light to the heat here.
The best part of the paper was this quote by Clausewitz:
“Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power! Any defect of action and effort will turn to the advantage of the enemy, and it will not be easy to change from a fencer’s position to that of a wrestler. A slight blow may then often be enough to cause a total collapse.”
And it is for this reason that I am deeply skeptical that we will 'win' in Afghanistan.
Great Clausewitz quote, I love that old Prussian. Well many people were sceptical about Iraq, too. I am a firm believer in the idea that no war is unwinnable if one fights the war one has and not the last war or the one one would like, that being said, my impression thus far on Afghanistan is that we are vastly underallocating resources to our boys on the ground. However, that is just an impression at this point, hard facts in a war take years of study and research over many AOs to come up with things that are generally true for an entire theatre and not just for one company or for one squads' time in country.
One thing that is pivotal on a larger scale (the strategic and policy levels rather than the tactical and operational levels) is the will to win.
I know this history stuff is too dry for most people, but the American Revolution was a failure of will on the part of the British, not a failure of ability. After Cornwallis was pinned in at Yorktown and surrendered, that did not HAVE to mean the end of the war. But the British had lost the will to pursue it further.
Clausewitz believed in something called the triumvirate of war. This is what determines what is decisive in a war. The triumvirate consists of three things, the head of the enemy government, the will of the enemy people, or the enemy armed forces. You must decide if what will be decisive is to take out the enemy government, to attack the enemy army, or to attack the will of the enemy people to continue the war.
In Vietnam, the NVA and VC attacked the will of the American People to continue the war and that proved decisive. In Somalia, it was not the will of the people or the ability of the American armed forces to continue the war but the will of the government to commit further.
All of this remains to be seen in Afghanistan, but if we figure out what type of war this is and what is decisive, ultimatley, we can win, but do we have the will?
Remember the enemy is also seeking wehat is decisive. He cannot obliterate our armed forces, we are too many. He cannot directly attack our government, ultimatley he must rely on the third leg of the triad, which is the will of the people and the will of our government to continue, only by this can we be defeated.
Too, comparisons to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan are misleading. The situation was different, the Afghanies were united against the Soviets, whereas today the Afghanies are divided among tribal and regional loyalties and warring with each other in some regions not just with us.
Anyway, I am by no means an authority on Afghanistan, I am a student of American wars in general and this policy and strategic level analysis is usually too broad for the guys on the ground. Their concerns are not strategy and the will to win at large, but whether they or their buddies will survive the day, the week, the month, and make it home--that's their concern.
Besides, we've gotten off topic now. The subject originally was the performance of small arms in one battle in Afghanistan and whether or not their malfunctioning was a contributing factor to the death of US troops in battle.
Wepons have failed in every war we have ever fought. Even the venerable M1 and BAR had issues at the Chosin Reservoir in Korea. It would take a much larger systematic analysis of the m4's performance in combat to conclude anything decisive about the weapon in general and whether some or all m4s in this battle broke down is in the larger scheme only anecdotal and not quantitative data.
Certainly we have seen a number of posts by men who have fired the M4 in anger and lived to tell about it and their experience weighs against the happenings here. My final point is that there is much more to a fight that determines whther men live or die than simply small arms' performance. The list of possible contributing factors to the given outcome of a fight are infinite: how much sleep had your guys had, how were they disposed emotionally, physically, what their mindset was, was the enemy well led, well motivated, did they plan their attack well, did it go according to plan, what was the weather like... the list is infinite and the factor of small arms is only one among many.
"Of C-Wire and HESCOs", an informative article at DefenseTech.org (one of a series)
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/005062.html
Interesting...
No Issues with M4 at Wanat
Now back to the M-4 COP Kahler/OP Topside debate.
I spoke with Col. Doug Tamilio, Program Manager for Soldier Weapons and Rich Audette, the Soldier Weapons deputy PM on Oct. 15 about the findings in a draft report on the so called "Battle of Wanat" that called out the M4 and the M-249 for multiple failures at "high cyclic rates" during the battle.
We've had a bit of a back and forth on this issue here at DT: was it a fundamental flaw with the M4 or was it a problem of leadership? Both sides are well represented here, but I thought I'd give the Army its say in this debate.
Tamilio said he was surprised with the findings and that he did not agree with the author's call for a systematic look at the M4's ability to keep up at high rates of fire.
"To date, I have never had a Soldier or a commander or an NCO come up to me and say 'these weapons are terrible'...Now I'm just talking about the M4. we don't get anything, no feedback, and you know if there was a serious issue out there somewhere in eight years of fighting with all the battles that we've had we would have some serious data."
Obviously Tamilio is defending his service's rifle, but he has a point. We all know that there are less maintenance-intensive options out there for troops who do their work in dusty environments (which is just about everywhere except the arctic and the jungle). But this issue of high rates of fire hasn't been brought up earlier.
The requirement for the M4 "mean time between stoppage" is 600 rounds. But Tamilio said today it demonstrates "3,600 rounds before stoppage...So that's a world-class weapon."
Tamilio said there are some "inconsistencies" between the draft history report and what he read and heard just after the battle. "We talked to the unit sergeant major a year ago and the report is not what I got first hand from him."
"I truly believe that some of these Soldiers fired so many rounds so quickly that could that happen? Yes," he added, explaining that he'd done tests with SOCOM where they fired 560 rounds in two minutes before the barrel warped.
"We knew this happened," Tamilio said. "We interviewed the unit, talked to them and then went on about our business because we didn't at that time think we had any issues with the M4 in that incident."
-- Christian
October 20, 2009 02:36 PM | M4 Monopoly | Discuss (92 comments)
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/cat_m4_monopoly.html
Blah Blah Blah,
30min TIC, fired 12 mags...
WTF are you shooting at -- shoot less, aim more
The peanut gallery here that has not been in combat should STFU.
Amen.
Cincinnatus
05-07-10, 01:51
http://www.armalite.com/images/Tech%20Notes/Tech%20Note%2048,%20Barrel%20Design,%20Heat,%20and%20Reliability,%20030824%E2%80%A6.pdf
Here's some great info on heat and weapon's failures that Sinister posted on another thread.
Powered by vBulletin® Version 4.2.5 Copyright © 2024 vBulletin Solutions, Inc. All rights reserved.