Organization & Weapons Carry by a U.S. Army Rifle Company in 2020

[AndyLate]

Excellent. Exactly what I was looking for.

Awesome! I did not have much luck finding a recent MTOE. The Weapon Systems Handbook leans a little towards aquisitions, not just currently fielded equipment, but it's useful info.

Andy

[cd228]

Unfortunately, The current MTOEs, while unclassified are not readily available to the public. However, older ones are on the net, and who knows what wikil........ has put out there.

[pinzgauer]

So it's kind of immaterial as the way US Army Infantry resources has been used in the last decade or two has very little to do with their formal structure/tactics.

Company level is where the big differences are seen. Most notably platoons and occasionally companies are often spread far away from interlocking support such that company and battalion level resources cannot be deployed.

If you look at some of the most notable failures in the Afghan war it is very apparent. ROE also becomes an issue. Just ask where the mortars are in certain bloody engagements.

Many of our popular threads and memes are dealing with symptoms of this issue. Pushes to reclaim the 800-1000m space by riflemen, etc.

Indirect fire being the main one, BN and company level support. Heavy/weapons company being parked on yet another hilltop rather than being a response or proactive coverage element. Or allocated out to reenforce the rifle companies.

They do seem to be trying to pivot out of some of the bad habits as more of the threat seems to be Russia and China. Or other conventional armies.

Less CQB emphasis. Increase emphasis on objects and longer range training. Increased emphasis not just on mortars, but getting out of bad habits with handheld mortars.

[1168]

So it's kind of immaterial as the way US Army Infantry resources has been used in the last decade or two has very little to do with their formal structure/tactics.

Company level is where the big differences are seen. Most notably platoons and occasionally companies are often spread far away from interlocking support such that company and battalion level resources cannot be deployed.

If you look at some of the most notable failures in the Afghan war it is very apparent. ROE also becomes an issue. Just ask where the mortars are in certain bloody engagements.

Many of our popular threads and memes are dealing with symptoms of this issue. Pushes to reclaim the 800-1000m space by riflemen, etc.

Indirect fire being the main one, BN and company level support. Heavy/weapons company being parked on yet another hilltop rather than being a response or proactive coverage element. Or allocated out to reenforce the rifle companies.

They do seem to be trying to pivot out of some of the bad habits as more of the threat seems to be Russia and China. Or other conventional armies.

Less CQB emphasis. Increase emphasis on objects and longer range training. Increased emphasis not just on mortars, but getting out of bad habits with handheld mortars.

Good points.

[cd228]

So it's kind of immaterial as the way US Army Infantry resources has been used in the last decade or two has very little to do with their formal structure/tactics.


They do seem to be trying to pivot out of some of the bad habits as more of the threat seems to be Russia and China. Or other conventional armies.

Less CQB emphasis. Increase emphasis on objects and longer range training. Increased emphasis not just on mortars, but getting out of bad habits with handheld mortars.

There is a heavy pivot to Large Scale Combat Operations AKA LSCO. The national training centers switched from COIN to LSCO scenarios several years ago. Heavy emphasis on maneuver and not staying in one place for too long. THere is a heavy modernization effort planned, but the budget has gotten tight as of late. We've added the 35mm to the Strykers, at least in Europe. The Carl Gustav is fielded and they are supposed to be fielding Squad Designated Marksman Rifles (and hopefully training). The SDMs may already be on the street. There is also some efforts to expand SAM availability. My personal opinion, we'll still need CQB/SRM for MOUT. I suspect that LSCO will still require COIN and other Stability OPS and those aren't easy. I'd also like to see the range on the Javelin improved and the TOW replaced with something that can "fire and forget" like the Spike or the Hellfire.

[pinzgauer]

Some other inputs:

- Infantry MTOE / structure in the field manuals is 2-3 years behind what is currently taught to IN CPT's at MCCC which often slightly behind what actual units are carrying/training with now.

- In addition to long term trends of pivot toward more conventional threats, there are also shorter term trends based on new hot areas/expected threats. Without going into specific weapon systems, today's infantry teams are better prepped to deal with air and armor threats, where that was simply not a consideration in what most folks (and soldiers) think of as the real world as defined by A'stan/Iraq.

- There are huge differences in MTOE between Light/Airborne vs Stryker vs Heavy (Bradleys) infantry

[cd228]

Some other inputs:

- Infantry MTOE / structure in the field manuals is 2-3 years behind what is currently taught to IN CPT's at MCCC which often slightly behind what actual units are carrying/training with now.

- In addition to long term trends of pivot toward more conventional threats, there are also shorter term trends based on new hot areas/expected threats. Without going into specific weapon systems, today's infantry teams are better prepped to deal with air and armor threats, where that was simply not a consideration in what most folks (and soldiers) think of as the real world as defined by A'stan/Iraq.

- There are huge differences in MTOE between Light/Airborne vs Stryker vs Heavy (Bradleys) infantry

Just wait till you to CGSC, its fire hose LSCO indoctrination. Being taught by folks who's last war was desert storm in some cases.