Time-Line Leading Up To The Collapse of Afghanistan

[Averageman]

this is pretty good and very relevant.

[WillBrink]

this is pretty good and very relevant.

If you read the OP, it's in line with the vid. I really dislike assuming intent as it can go tin foil hat real fast, but I simply can't believe this was just incompetence, but intentional. To follow the existing plan, may have left orange guy with a win and a lasting legacy, and that was something they could not allow. To dump a nation into complete darkness, throw 20 years of work away, thousands of US lives, trillions of dollars, and our national security, all to deny orange guy a win of any kind, is what happened in my view. The OP article suggests such if one reads between the lines also.

[alx01]

was to keep the airbase, with 2.5k troops, support Af mil

While 2.5k troops is better than nothing this number is laughable. If you consider non-combat and command personnel that would mean you have about 1500-2000 troops max. If you take into account 12-hour shifts without weekends/breaks/sick - that's 1000 available troops available best case scenario at any given time.

Just for the reference: I read somewhere that when Soviets had 100k troops (without local forces) in Afghanistan, by their own admission they controlled at most 15% of the country.

If you consider that our forces are 50 to 100 times more effective than the Soviets at the time (which very well might be), we would still have control of about 15% area with 1000-2000 active troops.

I admittedly have zero military knowledge and operate with just the reference numbers. I suspect if we had 5-12 major bases around the country, with 1500-2500 troops on each with the total number of around 15-25k soldiers, we could have had a good grip with that presence in AF.

We have 28k soldiers in Korea - in a country with a strong military and no active combat. Why we couldn't or should't keep at least 14k (half of what is in Korea) in AF from a peacekeeping or anti-terrorist perspective is puzzling.

[WillBrink]

While 2.5k troops is better than nothing this number is laughable. If you consider non-combat and command personnel that would mean you have about 1500-2000 troops max. If you take into account 12-hour shifts without weekends/breaks/sick - that's 1000 available troops available best case scenario at any given time.

Just for the reference: I read somewhere that when Soviets had 100k troops (without local forces) in Afghanistan, by their own admission they controlled at most 15% of the country.

If you consider that our forces are 50 to 100 times more effective than the Soviets at the time (which very well might be), we would still have control of about 15% area with 1000-2000 active troops.

I admittedly have zero military knowledge and operate with just the reference numbers. I suspect if we had 5-12 major bases around the country, with 1500-2500 troops on each with the total number of around 15-25k soldiers, we could have had a good grip with that presence in AF.

We have 28k soldiers in Korea - in a country with a strong military and no active combat. Why we couldn't or should't keep at least 14k (half of what is in Korea) in AF from a peacekeeping or anti-terrorist perspective is puzzling.

Did you read OP article or #20? 2.5k is explained and the person explaining it is SME squared.

[The_War_Wagon]

1) The election is stolen on behalf of SlowJoe

2)


Does that pretty much sum it up?

[Korgs130]

Have you read the article in the OP? Assuming it's accurate (and I personally trust that author's integrity and sources bigly...) it would appear as far as Trump was concerned, there were conditions, and and I suspect had he not felt the Taliban keeping up their end of it, both in spirit and as written, would have told them the deal was off, and Bagram would remain along with the required troops to secure it, etc. as long as required. I also think the Taliban aware Trump able and willing to tell them to blow out their ass being who he is, and knew Biden admin was utterly without backbone and would leave no matter what, and they could do what ever they pleased, which they did:

7 September 2019: Trump cancels US-Taliban peace talks after the group claimed responsibility for a car bomb that killed an American soldier. President Trump then calls the head of the Taliban and warns him that if he continues to kill American troops, he will meet the same fate as Iranian General Qasem Soleimani

29 February 2020: Trump announces a signed peace deal between the US and Nato allies, and the Taliban.

17 November 2020: In the final days of the Trump administration, the Pentagon announces plans to reduce troop numbers in Afghanistan from 4,500 to 2,500, which was to be completed by January 2021.

Note: What’s the logic of why they chose 2,500? It’s the minimum number of troops required to conduct what the military on the ground in Afghanistan determined was needed to prevent the vacuum-effect that President Trump was warned about in 2017. What were those tasks: first and foremost: to operate and secure Bagram Air Base (an air base as big as many US Air Force bases in the US). Bagram would become the sole remaining “base of operations” for US Forces from which they would provide air support during and after the transition. In addition to operating and securing Bagram as an Air Base, it would also provide support to the small agile special operations liaison teams so they could deploy throughout the country to support and advise Afghan Special Forces at their bases and outposts around the country. Why did the Afghans still need US military liaison teams? Courage is contagious and so is common sense. Although the Afghan Special Forces had already proven themselves to their American Special Mission Unit advisers in battle, the Afghan military was a new army that hadn’t operated by itself (meaning without US units or other govt agency advisers). A key lesson learned from our all at once pull-out in Viet Nam was that we should have conducted a slower more adaptive draw-down. The Afghans did not have any experience or frame of reference for how to command and control themselves as an independent organization. These liaison teams were an integral part of the draw-down because they would allow for a gradual transition that would enable the Afghan military and its Political leaders to withstand what everyone predicted would be a full-scale attack by the Taliban as soon as the American main-body pulled out. If the Afghan military could hold the Taliban off during this period they would learn that they are strong enough to defeat the Taliban in battle, while also gaining confidence and experience to operate on their own.

Next date is Biden is sworn in, and it all goes to complete chit after that. Far as I'm concerned, that's 100% on Biden. He owns that.

Will, you nailed it. Completely agree.

[alx01]

Did you read OP article or #20? 2.5k is explained and the person explaining it is SME squared.

Yes, I did read the original article, Will.

According to this article: https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/...n-afghanistan/

General Stanley McChrystal planned for 80,000 troops to launch a counteroffensive in Afghanistan in the summer of 2009.

Your source is saying that 33x (thirty three times) less force would have been sufficient vs what U.S. command thought was needed 10 years ago when Taliban was much weaker.

No offense to you or the author of the original article. I respectfully disagree with him just based on the numbers. He provided a lot of interesting insight and viewpoints, but I think he's justifying things he wants to see rather than being objective based on the historical data.

Saying that 2.5k support troops operating out of one airfield would have addressed an issue of dysfunctional military for the whole country (as large as AF) is a very, very significant exaggeration.

In a large scheme of things it does not really matter if you have 2.5k or 25k troops in the country. From the size perspective of U.S. military it's almost the same number.

[WillBrink]

Yes, I did read the original article, Will.

According to this article: https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/...n-afghanistan/

Your source is saying that 33x (thirty three times) less force would have been sufficient vs what U.S. command thought was needed 10 years ago when Taliban was much weaker.

No offense to you or the author of the original article. I respectfully disagree with him just based on the numbers. He provided a lot of interesting insight and viewpoints, but I think he's justifying things he wants to see rather than being objective based on the historical data.

Saying that 2.5k support troops operating out of one airfield would have addressed an issue of dysfunctional military for the whole country (as large as AF) is a very, very significant exaggeration.

In a large scheme of things it does not really matter if you have 2.5k or 25k troops in the country. From the size perspective of U.S. military it's almost the same number.

Blaber more than sufficiently explained it in my view. Obviously we will never know at this point whether the approach would have been successful.

If anyone has the experience, creds, quals, to offer that opinion, who worked in far smaller numbers with air support and the locals, to kick the snot out of the Taliban early on, who planned Operation Anaconda and the bombing of Tora Bora, it's retired Col. Blaber.

Add to what Blaber said about Milley and where his focus was, to undermine Trump, it does not come as a surprise he may have committed treason in addition to intentionally making sure Afg went down that way to prevent any possible win for Trump:

https://www.m4carbine.net/showthread...92#post2977992

[legumeofterror]

Have you read the article in the OP? Assuming it's accurate (and I personally trust that author's integrity and sources bigly...) it would appear as far as Trump was concerned, there were conditions, and and I suspect had he not felt the Taliban keeping up their end of it, both in spirit and as written, would have told them the deal was off, and Bagram would remain along with the required troops to secure it, etc. as long as required. I also think the Taliban aware Trump able and willing to tell them to blow out their ass being who he is, and knew Biden admin was utterly without backbone and would leave no matter what, and they could do what ever they pleased, which they did:

7 September 2019: Trump cancels US-Taliban peace talks after the group claimed responsibility for a car bomb that killed an American soldier. President Trump then calls the head of the Taliban and warns him that if he continues to kill American troops, he will meet the same fate as Iranian General Qasem Soleimani

29 February 2020: Trump announces a signed peace deal between the US and Nato allies, and the Taliban.

17 November 2020: In the final days of the Trump administration, the Pentagon announces plans to reduce troop numbers in Afghanistan from 4,500 to 2,500, which was to be completed by January 2021.

Note: What’s the logic of why they chose 2,500? It’s the minimum number of troops required to conduct what the military on the ground in Afghanistan determined was needed to prevent the vacuum-effect that President Trump was warned about in 2017. What were those tasks: first and foremost: to operate and secure Bagram Air Base (an air base as big as many US Air Force bases in the US). Bagram would become the sole remaining “base of operations” for US Forces from which they would provide air support during and after the transition. In addition to operating and securing Bagram as an Air Base, it would also provide support to the small agile special operations liaison teams so they could deploy throughout the country to support and advise Afghan Special Forces at their bases and outposts around the country. Why did the Afghans still need US military liaison teams? Courage is contagious and so is common sense. Although the Afghan Special Forces had already proven themselves to their American Special Mission Unit advisers in battle, the Afghan military was a new army that hadn’t operated by itself (meaning without US units or other govt agency advisers). A key lesson learned from our all at once pull-out in Viet Nam was that we should have conducted a slower more adaptive draw-down. The Afghans did not have any experience or frame of reference for how to command and control themselves as an independent organization. These liaison teams were an integral part of the draw-down because they would allow for a gradual transition that would enable the Afghan military and its Political leaders to withstand what everyone predicted would be a full-scale attack by the Taliban as soon as the American main-body pulled out. If the Afghan military could hold the Taliban off during this period they would learn that they are strong enough to defeat the Taliban in battle, while also gaining confidence and experience to operate on their own.

Next date is Biden is sworn in, and it all goes to complete chit after that. Far as I'm concerned, that's 100% on Biden. He owns that.

I did read the article and my point stands. Either Trump and Co. were lying when hey signed the treaty or your assertions that they intended to leave troops in country to assist the Afghan government is nonsense. The Taliban held up thier end, which was very little and by design because we wanted to ensure we got out, and we were definitely leaving. These claims of a "different plan" don't line up with reality. They were going to leave the Afghan government high and dry, allowing it to collapse. If they had any actual intention of ensuring thier success what was no effort at all made to adress the problems layer out in the SIGAR reports? Why were there zero provisions in place in the treaty to compel the Taliban to respect and integrate into the existing government? Or any protection at all for the Afghan government or people other than vague requirements for "talks"? Why were they not included or consulted in the negotiations? They planned to **** them over from the start. To think otherwise is foolishness, IMO.

[WillBrink]

I did read the article and my point stands. Either Trump and Co. were lying when hey signed the treaty or your assertions that they intended to leave troops in country to assist the Afghan government is nonsense. The Taliban held up thier end, which was very little and by design because we wanted to ensure we got out, and we were definitely leaving. These claims of a "different plan" don't line up with reality. They were going to leave the Afghan government high and dry, allowing it to collapse. If they had any actual intention of ensuring thier success what was no effort at all made to adress the problems layer out in the SIGAR reports? Why were there zero provisions in place in the treaty to compel the Taliban to respect and integrate into the existing government? Or any protection at all for the Afghan government or people other than vague requirements for "talks"? Why were they not included or consulted in the negotiations? They planned to **** them over from the start. To think otherwise is foolishness, IMO.

As does mine. I have no reason to believe Blaber is not in the know to a level and extent few others are, and regardless, the plan to at least use Bagram as the obvious staging location for that final and total withdrawal was obvious to anyone with two working neurons. I personally feel the way it went was not mere incompetence but intentional for reasons outlined.