REAPR 338 machine Gun for SOF

[WillBrink]

The sliding feed tray assembly is a significant improvement over the 240. Barrel changes look...interesting...from a crew served perspective. I can see it being a challenge to AG and swap barrels, but I have exactly zero reps doing so with this weapon and I'm likely overthinking it.

Having caliber conversions will make training at established MOUT sites and ranges easier. We ran into issues with some ranges in the first years of the move to 855A1, so having the ability to run M80 ball if needed will help overcome that potential hurdle (if it is one at all; just speculating based on the reported max effective distance and possible damage to permanent range structures).

It's a cool concept. Like the KAC LAMG that's being tested and fielded in a limited capacity, it's cool to see advancements being made in machine gun tech.

What's cool to me is, it's using some of the best tech of older stuff (resembles the MG34 for a reason...), combined with new tech, vs just being new and cool for the gee wiz factor. It has less parts than a 240 vs more.

[pinzgauer]

Out enemies learned to hover just outside the range of 7.62 MGs and hit us when it was unlikely we'd have M2s on hand during things like patrols.

While the enemy behavior was real, the root cause was far more complicated then needing a machine gun with longer range.

My son was line PL in the battalion in the 173rd airborne that two very famous incidents in the korengal were documented. He served with and for people who were in these famous incidents. (Restrepo, "Chosen Few", etc )

Their walk away after quite a bit of analysis has nothing to do with the range of the machine guns.

The root causes were:

1) bad rules of engagement which did not allow the use of mortars. Modern infantry companies have tools to deal with area situations outside the range their machine guns. Is the light mortars. At that particular time they had a very difficult time getting permission to use mortars due to concerns over villagers and such. The enemy knew this and took advantage of it.

2) bad tactics in spreading companies and even platoons too far apart where they could not assist each other and the bigger mortars could not be brought to bear. This could have been just too few of troops covering too wide of an area because doctrinally they know not to isolate platoons and companies.

3) bad habit/training scars. The light mortar that line infantryman have has a much shorter range if used handheld then with the base plate. Due to the mountainous terrain no one wanted to lug the base plate around and it became convenient just to use them handheld. But that significantly limited their range to not much further than the 249 and 240s.

During my son's time this mistake was viewed as being entirely within their unit's control in the senior NCOs hammered this point.

Any discussion of carbines and machine guns with further range is immediately met with the reality that they don't get to train with either at even the current stated range limits, much less the further ranges of super weapons.

From memory with the 249s they do shoot out to 800 at the big places like Benning/Moore which have dedicated machine gun ranges. But a lot of ranges and certainly the live fire ranges just are not set up to handle that distance as I understand it.

The other issue is combat loadouts with the superweapons in most cases you have reduced ammo for the same weight and in mountainous train they already at limits.

This is true with 6.8 SPC and Grendel, it just doesn't solve a problem they have. The range trade off would not be worth the reduced ammo loadout

[SteyrAUG]

While the enemy behavior was real, the root cause was far more complicated then needing a machine gun with longer range.

My son was line PL in the battalion in the 173rd airborne that two very famous incidents in the korengal were documented. He served with and for people who were in these famous incidents. (Restrepo, "Chosen Few", etc )

Their walk away after quite a bit of analysis has nothing to do with the range of the machine guns.

The root causes were:

1) bad rules of engagement which did not allow the use of mortars. Modern infantry companies have tools to deal with area situations outside the range their machine guns. Is the light mortars. At that particular time they had a very difficult time getting permission to use mortars due to concerns over villagers and such. The enemy knew this and took advantage of it.

2) bad tactics in spreading companies and even platoons too far apart where they could not assist each other and the bigger mortars could not be brought to bear. This could have been just too few of troops covering too wide of an area because doctrinally they know not to isolate platoons and companies.

3) bad habit/training scars. The light mortar that line infantryman have has a much shorter range if used handheld then with the base plate. Due to the mountainous terrain no one wanted to lug the base plate around and it became convenient just to use them handheld. But that significantly limited their range to not much further than the 249 and 240s.

During my son's time this mistake was viewed as being entirely within their unit's control in the senior NCOs hammered this point.

Any discussion of carbines and machine guns with further range is immediately met with the reality that they don't get to train with either at even the current stated range limits, much less the further ranges of super weapons.

From memory with the 249s they do shoot out to 800 at the big places like Benning/Moore which have dedicated machine gun ranges. But a lot of ranges and certainly the live fire ranges just are not set up to handle that distance as I understand it.

The other issue is combat loadouts with the superweapons in most cases you have reduced ammo for the same weight and in mountainous train they already at limits.

This is true with 6.8 SPC and Grendel, it just doesn't solve a problem they have. The range trade off would not be worth the reduced ammo loadout

Consider all of the above as accepted.

Seems to me what this potentially brings to the table is a Medium machine gun with about the same weight as a M240 but twice the range with a comparable weight penalty when it comes to ammo. That is assuming it survives in conditions like Afghanistan.

[SteyrAUG]

Hovering outside of our range is our fault. We should be 'closing with', not 'standing off.' We've largely forgotten that doctrine.

The M9 was fine outside of some crappy mags in the beginning of Iraq.

Hard to close with the enemy in places in Astan when you base was a bowl at the bottom of a valley. Seems like we just picked some shitty locations to establish combat outposts.

[Averageman]

Hard to close with the enemy in places in Astan when you base was a bowl at the bottom of a valley. Seems like we just picked some shitty locations to establish combat outposts.

I remember reading about an outpost being over run while I was in Iraq. If it's the same one, yes, they picked a horrible spot to defend from.

[WillBrink]

I remember reading about an outpost being over run while I was in Iraq. If it's the same one, yes, they picked a horrible spot to defend from.

I'm assuming Combat Outpost Keating. Ash Hess was there for the first attempt. Starts at 49:46 if you just want to jump to that topic.

[SteyrAUG]

I'm assuming Combat Outpost Keating. Ash Hess was there for the first attempt. Starts at 49:46 if you just want to jump to that topic.

There were a few, but yeah Keating probably being the worst. Watching that footage for the first time was just crushing. I always wondered who thought that location was suitable and why.

[titsonritz]

I'm assuming Combat Outpost Keating.

That was my first thought. Clint Eastwood’s son starred in the movie version.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Outpost_(2019_film)

[chuckman]

Hard to close with the enemy in places in Astan when you base was a bowl at the bottom of a valley. Seems like we just picked some shitty locations to establish combat outposts.

Yeah, that was never my experience....

[pinzgauer]

There were a few, but yeah Keating probably being the worst. Watching that footage for the first time was just crushing. I always wondered who thought that location was suitable and why.

To understand the bad siting you have to understand their mission. This was the whole reconstruction era and they were supposed to be helping locals rebuild infrastructure etc.

The sites were selected due to being on crossroads, valley junctions or similar and not for any defensive tactical value. This was very common in that era.

Both the Battle of Kamdesh (COP Keating 10th mtn) and the Battle of Wanat (173rd ABN) in the Korengal suffered greatly from being too spread out and thus ended up being greatly outnumbered.

Both involved platoon size infantry elements of about 45 to 50 soldiers up against 250-300 seasoned Taliban fighters. (Some estimates are as high as 500, and the enemy death toll backs up these larger figures)

The army has tried to learn from these, both battles are majorly studied by officer candidates, but you have to point very large fingers at the Commander-in-Chief, questionable mission and unrealistic ROE.

Would really recommend three books and a documentary:

10th mtn @ Kamdesh:
Outlaw Platoon

173rd @ Wanat:
To quell the Koringal
Chosen Few
RESTREPO

Wanat was the bloodiest engagement in a'stan, made worse as the US kia were all out of one platoon.

All three books are good but tough reads, partially because you know the outcome, but also partially because you shake your head at why we would ever put soldiers into those positions.

RESTREPO is a must see documentary, closely followed by Hornet's Nest