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Thread: Weapon failures failed for US troops death

  1. #61
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    From the Times article -

    "The base and a nearby observation post were held by just 48 American troops and 24 Afghan soldiers. Nine Americans died and 27 were injured, most in the first 20 minutes of the fight. Four Afghan soldiers were also wounded."

    So thats what 55% casualties overall with 75% of the US troops injured or killed, and most of the casualties taken in the 20 minutes of a 4 hour firefight? Damn . . .

  2. #62
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    Quote Originally Posted by Sam View Post
    Kevin:

    This topic has hit every gun forums, I've seen you replied to another forum's post. I've read in more than one post from soldiers returning from that area that only special operation forces are issued full auto version of M4s. Other soldiers including the personnel reported in the article were only issued the version with 3 round burst. Is that correct? If so, the article has a big hole in it.

    Thanks.
    Sam,

    Big Army has the M4: SAFE, SEMI, BURST (3rd)
    SOCOM M4A1: SAFE, SEMI, AUTO

    From what I posted on Lightfighter.



    quote:

    Originally posted by Dirt: "I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn't charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down."


    Let me translate.



    "I am a s**tty shot and do not know the difference between aimed fire and wasted ammuntion."





    Yes Afghans can attack like ceaselss swarms of cockroaches (maybe we should bring back Flamethrowers for FOB defense, or Quad .50's?)



    However I really can't see anyone firing 336-360 rds within 30min for good effect in the OEF AOR.





    Quiet honestly a good 75% of non-SOF forces I have seen in OEF and OIF as both mil and a contractor, had weapons that where in a serious need of both PM and suffering a serious lack of weapons skills.



    The other point, is damn as smart as we think we are, sometimes in this day and age you can get overun by a vastly numerically superior force.





    Taliban are not dumb, they will try to flank you and supress you so you don't know where they are moving to. Its not like playing wack-a-mole with Madhi Army types in '04 Iraq. Your not goint to get a great amount of enemy exposure.



    I will say for 99% of the time that I have seen it, is that "suppressive" fire, isn't. Accurate fire suppresses and causes casualties, inaccurate fire wastes ammo.



    There is nothing wrong with the M4 (well I'd have everyone go M4A1 as the 3rd burst system makes my head bleed with its stupidity, and I'd remove the auto-sears from 3/4 of the guns. Combat Marksmanship is terrible these days - judging distance and placing accurate fire off the KD range is lacking.

    What is needed is more realistic training for soldiers.



    Lube - for f**ks sakes people, its 2009, we have been fighting for 8 years in Afghan, and guns are still not getting properly lubed That is a HUGE chain of command failure.



    Mags -- PMAG's have a f**king NSN now - use it.



    Ammo - M855 may not be the best, its way better than it was in the past, and its way better than 7.62x39 for shooting people with. That said a new 5.56mm ammo like the BH/Barnes 70gr OTM would IMHO be better for both accuracy and terminal effects since we are not fighting an enemy in soft armor and plates.



    I carried a M16FOW for over 20 years - I've never been let down by one, and if I all of a sudden needed to lay my ass on the line today, that system would be my first pick.

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  3. #63
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    Thanks Kevin, that is well said there and here.

    If you have to put a compensator on a 9mm, maybe you should buy panties instead of briefs - Ken Hackathorn via Facebook live

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  4. #64
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    This is a gun board primarily so it's natural we focus on the weapons' performance issues from the OP. I think this is likely a "hook" that caught the journalists eyes to key in on. Too much we cannot know. But here is an interesting dispatch via Bill Roggio and The Long War Journal.
    Maybe some folks failed to do their jobs right (lube? barrel changes?) or maybe they did the best that could be done under the circumstances. But either way, I think all indications are most must have been doing their jobs very very well to have survived at all.

    http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat...the_battle.php

    An early account of the battle at Camp Keating
    By Bill RoggioOctober 11, 2009 9:43 PM

    At The Best Defense, Tom Ricks published an "earwitness account" of the battle at Camp Keating in Kamdish in Nuristan province. The account comes via General Barry McCaffrey, and is given by an unnamed military officer serving in nearby Laghman province whose position is not identified, and I won't speculate further. The full account is published below, with permission of Mr. Ricks. I'll define the acronyms and other confusing terms in brackets.

    Just a few notes:

    • The troop commander seemed to be very level-headed during the battle, and adjusted in a professional manner to several serious setbacks, such as losing his command post and ammunition dump. Only at one point did he appear to be rattled, early on when urging the helicopter to get on the scene as soon as possible lest the camp be fully overrun. The Squadron commander let his troop commander manage the battle and got the troop commander whatever resources he could.
    • The base was nearly overrun. As mentioned, the US troops temporarily lost control of the command post and ammunition dump, and the troop commander lost contact with some of his troops. The Afghan Army and Afghan security guards' checkpoints were completely overrun and set aflame.
    • The US troops fought hard, and lost eight of their brothers. It could have been much worse. The helicopter and air support was the great equalizer against the massed Taliban assault.
    • The US troops lost nearly everything they owned during the battle save the clothes on their backs. You can help them out by donating to the American Legion, which has set up a program, called the COP Keating Relief Fund to specifically help these men. Follow this link to help.

    Here are the facts, without revealing sensitive information. I feel compelled to write this because I heard some very fine, brave Americans fought for their very lives Saturday, 03 OCT 09. They fought magnificently.
    Eight of them made the Ultimate Sacrifice. I don't know their names, only their call signs. Though it may have been smaller in scale, and shorter in duration, their battle was no less heroic than the exploits of their ancestors, in places like LZ Xray or Fire Base Ripcord in Vietnam. I want people to know that there are still some GREAT Americans who serve in the US Army, fighting for Freedom, who will probably never be given the due they deserve. I don't know ALL the facts, only what I overheard on the satellite radio.

    COP [Combat Outpost] Keating was (past tense) located on low ground, near a river, surrounded by mountains - a poor place to have to defend to begin with. The village of Kamdesh was nearby, as was a mosque. About two platoons and a cavalry troop headquarters occupied the COP - Combat Outpost. If you Google COP Keating, you will find a Washington Times article describing the austere conditions there, written earlier this year. I was on duty from 0600-1800 (6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) on Saturday, 03 OCT 09, and heard, first-hand, the events I am about to recount transpire. I took notes as the battle unfolded.

    Things were relatively quiet when I came on shift at 0600. Not too long afterward, I heard a call sign describing taking small arms fire at his position. (That in itself is not alarming - I hear that frequently because I hear satellite radio transmissions from all sorts of units who operate in Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman (where I am) and in Nuristan Provinces, where this happened.) The situation, then began to deteriorate. The Troop Commander - urgently - requested rotary wing gunships to support him. He was told they were 45 minutes away, and that he should use his 120 mm mortars. He replied that the mortar pit was pinned down, and that the could not employ his 120 mm mortars. I did not know until I saw an aerial photo later that day, after I got off shift, that the COP was located in a "bowl," surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground. The insurgents were shooting down into the mortar pit from above. The 120 mm mortars from OP [Outpost] Fritshe, a few kilometers away were able to help a little, but it was not enough. Not too long after the fight started, the Troop Commander said that he had a KIA [Killed in Action], and several wounded.

    Uh-Oh - now this is getting serious. Not too much longer after that, the Troop Commander, in a voice that was not panic'd, but which had a sense of urgency said, "We've got people inside our wire!!!" He said that he had lost communications with some of his elements at different places on the COP. He had had to abandon his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and all the various means of redundant communications there (MIRC Chat, Blue Force Tracker, tactical FM radios, etc.) His only means of communication was the satellite radio he was using. He said he urgently needed air support. The number of KIA began to climb.

    He kept asking about the helicopters - his higher headquarters said they were "30 minutes out..." He said that if he did not get help soon, they were going to be overrun. He had consolidated the Soldiers he had, to include dead and wounded, in a tight perimeter on part of his COP. He advised that the Afghan National Army (ANA) side of the COP was completely overrun and was on fire. The insurgents had gotten into his perimeter where the ANA latrine bordered his perimeter, after they had overrun the ANA camp. His Entry Control Point (ECP) where some Afghan Security Guards (ASG) had been had been overrun.

    The ANP Police Checkpoint had been overrun and he was taking a heavy volume of fire from that. He was taking a lot of RPG [Rocket Propelled Grenade] fire from the mosque. His Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was under insurgent control. He kept asking about the helicopters.He was told, "Passing Checkpoint 12..." He said, "I'm telling you that if they don't get here f***in' soon, we're all going to f***in' die!!!" Shortly after that, his Squadron Commander came up on the radio and told him that he was going to be OK, that help was on the way. The SCO [Squadron Commander] said that he needed to come up on FM and talk to the helicopters, who should be arriving very soon. The Troop Commander said that the Harris was all he had at the moment, and asked that the Squadron relay. It was, obviously, a very anxious time. I was afraid that at any moment, the Troop commander would just stop transmitting, and that would mean that they were likely all dead and dying. Someone asked the Troop commander what his target priorities were, and he said that "anything outside the wire" was controlled by bad guys. He mentioned that he needed gun runs at a particular wall, and mentioned certain Target Reference Points (TRP's) such as "the putting green" and "the diving board." Finally, the helicopters arrived and began killing insurgents. It became clear, however, that it was such a target-rich environment that much more air support was needed. The helicopters gave the defenders enough breathing room to better position themselves, reload, etc. Under the umbrella of the gunships, the Troop Commander said that he was going to try to re-take some of his camp. The SCO calmly encouraged him to "fire and maneuver." As they regained some lost ground, the Troop Commander said that he was finding some of his unaccounted for Soldiers, and that they were KIA. He gave their battle roster numbers. Things were looking better, but it was still a fierce fight. I could hear a cacophony of machine gun fire when the Troop Commander keyed that microphone to talk. The mortars were still pinned won, with one KIA and wounded in the mortar pit. After only a short time, gunships had to leave to rearm and refuel, heading to FOB Bostic. (FOB Bostic was hit with indirect fire, also, throughout the day.) The weather in the high passes interfered with the helicopters. Close Air Support in the form of jets were on the way, and the Troop Commander was asked to provide Target Numbers, which he did. He was still being pressed on all sides, still taking a heavy volume of small arms fire and RPG's. He had regained some buildings, but had not been able to re-capture all his perimeter. He found at least one MBITR and was able to communicate with aircraft a little better.

    Once the jets arrived overhead, they began to drop bombs on the masses, the swarms of insurgents. Usually, the insurgents conduct a raid at dawn, do their damage, and flee. Not this day. I looked at my watch, and it was after 1000 and the insurgents were still attacking, even though it should have become clear to them after the close air arrived that they could no longer hope to completely overrun the camp. The Close Air was on station continuously after that, and as soon as one plane dropped its bombs and strafed, another came down to hit targets - some very close to camp. The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there. A target described as a "switchback" was bombed repeatedly and the insurgents seemed to simply re-occupy it only to be bombed out of it again. (Several pieces of weapons and equipment has since been found there.) The "North Face" was also repeatedly bombed and strafed.

    A plan was developed to get reinforcements to COP Keating. Because it was still "too hot" to land helicopters, they were flown to OP Fritshe and had to walk to COP Keating. Asked about his ammunition (Class 5) at about 1300, the Troop commander said that he was "red" on 7.62 link and MK19 ammunition [the MK19 is a belt-fed automatic 40 mm grenade launcher, the 7.62 ammo would be used in M240 machineguns]. Not too long after that, he stated that he was "black" (supply exhausted) on 7.62, but still had a lot of .50 caliber. More KIA were found, and the Troop Commander said that they were missing their sensitive items (weapons, night vision, MBITR radios - things like that.) The KIA number rose to 5. There were constant updates on a particular wounded Soldier who had a broken leg and a crushed pelvis. They said that he had lost a lot of blood, but was on an IV, and was "hanging in there." The Troop Commander said that he had two ANA KIA, and several wounded, still with him. He said that a lot of the ANA - about 12 - had broken and run when the COP began to be overrun. (Some of their bodies were found nearby the next day, along with some ASG who were wounded.) The Troop Commander said that the insurgents had made off with the ANA's B-10 Rocket Launcher. Throughout the day, the air support targeted a B-10 launch site, but it was unclear if it was the same system that the ANA had lost of not.

    The SCO got on the net and said that there was a plan to bring in a CH-47 Chinook as soon as it got dark, with attack helicopters overhead, and that they would bring in ammo and Soldiers and evacuate the wounded and dead. The SCO said that he would fly in, also. During the battle, the SCO always seemed calm and gave a lot of encouragement to the Troop Commander on the ground. He asked for updates (Situation Reports - "SITREPS") but he did not nag the Troop Commander for it every 5 minutes. He let the Troop Commander fight the fight, frequently asking him what he needed and asking him how he and his Soldiers were doing, offering encouragement, but not micromanaging.

    The fighting continued all day, even though it was not as intense as it had been in the early morning. As the relief column approached from OP Fritshe, it got into a brief fight, quickly killing two insurgents and capturing their ICOM radios and RPG's. Then, they continued on toward COP Keating. The fire that had completely leveled the ANA side of the COP was spreading from building to building, and was setting the COP on fire. The Troop Commander and his Soldiers had to evacuate their TOC again, because it caught on fire.

    Many of the barracks buildings caught on fire and burned, taking the Soldiers' possessions with them. Only one or two buildings were left by the time it was over. As night approached, the Troop Commander told someone (S-3? FSO?) [the S-3 is the supply officer, the FSO is the Fire Support Officer, who would coordinate with the attack helos] that if the air cover were lost, and if they were attacked again, they were "done." The Troop Commander was assured that he would have adequate air support. The CSM [Command Sergeant Major] came up on the net and asked the Troop Commander to try to expand his perimeter in order to try to get accountability of everyone. The Troop Commander said that he "just can't do it, I just don't have enough people. I have too many wounded." The CSM said that he understood, but that he was looking at a cold body on the Predator feed near the maintenance building, and thought that that might be the final missing soldier. (It was later determined that that was not him.) The Troop Commander said that there were "a lot" of dead insurgents lying dead inside his perimeter, and he could be seeing one of those.

    I went off shift at 1800. At that time, there were 6 US KIA, and one missing, later found and determined to be KIA. I do not know where the 8th KIA came from: either one of the wounded died, or earlier there was a mistake in regard to accountability.

    The next day (Sunday, 4 OCT) when I came to work, I learned that they had found the unaccounted-for Soldier(s) and had made it through the night. During the late morning, the SCO came up on the net and briefed someone about the situation. He said that of five (5) HMMWV's, only one was still running. They had counted eight (8) RPG impacts on one HMMWV {Humvee] alone. He said that the HMMWV's were shot all to pieces. The camp Bobcat had a window shot out, but was still running, and they were still using it to move things.

    There was a lot of UXO's (unexploded ordnance) that made the area hazardous, such as unexploded US mortar rounds that had been scattered, as well as AT-4's and Javelin's [rocket launchers]. Most of the Soldiers on the COP had lost all their possessions except for what they were wearing. A plan was already being developed to get them new TA-50, uniforms, boots, toiletries, etc. once they were extracted. There were a lot of sensitive items that needed to be lifted out, because they are serial numbered items that needed to be accounted for, but most everything was ruined. They discussed whether to insert engineers with a lot of explosive to blow everything up, or whether to call in air strikes after everyone was evacuated and try to destroy what was left that way. Even at this point, they were still taking the occasional odd, angry shot or rocket fire. As I type this, I am still listening to the folks who are left at COP Keating, figuring out what to destroy, how best to destroy it (demo vs. aerial bombs or rockets) what to fly out, and making a plan on how best to get that done so they can abandon and close the COP.



    Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat...#ixzz0TlCkAILd
    "Whatever it's for; it wasn't possible until now!!!" - KrampusArms

  5. #65
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    [yes, note the error in the author mis-identifying the S-3 as a suppy officer. A typo I'm sure]

    More importantly this link didn't survive posting above:

    The US troops lost nearly everything they owned during the battle save the clothes on their backs. You can help them out by donating to the American Legion, which has set up a program, called the COP Keating Relief Fund to specifically help these men. Follow this link to help.


    http://burnpit.legion.org/2009/10/th...ps-of-361-cav/
    Last edited by JHC; 10-12-09 at 18:07.
    "Whatever it's for; it wasn't possible until now!!!" - KrampusArms

  6. #66
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    I posted this on other forums, but here's an article from 1941 about the Garand vs the Springfield (among others) in mud/dirt.

    http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...4292-3,00.html

  7. #67
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    JHC thanks for the post. Good debreif, even if from a distant station. The AARs will be gone over for some time, I wii need to try and get on SIPR this week.0
    pro-patria.us

  8. #68
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    Quote Originally Posted by Sam View Post
    Of course the story only a general report, no cause or what type of failures were reported.

    http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091011/...apons_failures


    WASHINGTON – In the chaos of an early morning assault on a remote U.S. outpost in eastern Afghanistan, Staff Sgt. Erich Phillips' M4 carbine quit firing as militant forces surrounded the base. The machine gun he grabbed after tossing the rifle aside didn't work either.



    The study by Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., hasn't been publicly released. Copies of the study have been leaked to news organizations and are circulating on the Internet.

    Cubbison's study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat. He describes a well-coordinated attack by a highly skilled enemy that unleashed a withering barrage with AK-47 automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
    woah I know Doug- so does Luke McGillie on here...


    more of his work:
    http://www.csmid.com/files/pay.html

    http://www.csmid.com/files/coins.html


    Last I knew he was working at Fort Drum as a unit historian or something to that effect. I don't have any real opinion on his research, just thought that it was somewhat interesting that he has gone from writing papers on 18th c British soldiers to this...
    Last edited by MPi-KMS-72; 10-12-09 at 19:45.

  9. #69
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    Quote Originally Posted by KevinB View Post
    Blah Blah Blah,

    30min TIC, fired 12 mags...

    WTF are you shooting at -- shoot less, aim more

    The peanut gallery here that has not been in combat should STFU.
    LMAO!!!!!
    ACADEMI Firearms, Tactics and Driving Instructor
    VA Arms Co FFL/SOT part-time armorer
    certified HK/BUSHMASTER armorer
    “There are only two kinds of people that understand Marines: Marines and the enemy. Everyone else has a second-hand opinion."

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    I think it's plain to see that this story goes back to Sen. Coburn's attempt to get rid of the M4 as America's battle rifle.

    Now he's got a reporter cherry-picking an event from over a year ago and comparing that event to a recent battle in order to "justify" why the Army needs to buy new rifles.

    I say hogwash.

    The real blame is not the rifle, but as others here have said, the blame rests with those individuals that allowed such an attack to occur.

    This is nothing more than a political attempt by one senator to procure an arms deal.

    Nothing to see here. Move along...

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